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INCENTIVIZING THE UTILIZATION 
OF PHARMACOGENOMICS IN DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT 
VALERIE GUTMANN KOCH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The last decades have witnessed remarkable advancements in the fields of 
genetics and genomics, highlighted by the successful completion of the map of the 
human genome in 2003.1 With this achievement came scientific possibilities that, 
only a few decades earlier, seemed more science fiction than reality. Of these 
developments, pharmacogenomics is hailed by many as a panacea for problems 
associated with pharmaceutical drug use and development.2 The Human Genome 
Project (HGP) and associated research have demonstrated that all human beings 
share 99.9 percent of their DNA.3 Pharmacogenomics focuses on the 0.1 percent 
differences between individuals and promises to allow physicians to tailor a 
patient‘s prescription according to his or her genetic profile, reducing painful and 
sometimes deadly side effects, ensuring appropriate dosage decisions, and targeting 
specific disease pathways.4   
 
Copyright © 2012 by Valerie Gutmann Koch. 
* Valerie Gutmann Koch, J.D. is the Senior Attorney for the New York State Task Force on Life and the 
Law. The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not reflect those of the New York State 
Department of Health, Health Research, Inc., or the Task Force. The author would like to acknowledge 
Peter Hutt in the conception of this article. 
 1. The Human Genome Project ―sequenced a single genome‖ for about 4 billion dollars, and Craig 
Venter, a leader in the field of biotechnology, did it for 100 million dollars. Getting Personal: The 
Promise of Cheap Genome Sequencing, ECONOMIST (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/13437974.?story_id=13437974. 
 2. See Michael J. Meurer, Pharmacogenomics, Genetic Tests, and Patent-Based Incentives, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 399, 403 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) 
(acknowledging the promise of ―tailored medicine‖); see also Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and 
the Practice of Medicine, 405 NATURE 857, 857, 863 (2000) (foreseeing the ability to use DNA to 
predict drug reactions). But see John A. Robertson et al., Pharmacogenetic Challenges for the Health 
Care System, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2002, at 155, 157 (questioning whether genetic effects are 
significant or predictable enough to alter drug therapy). 
 3. Press Release, Nat‘l Human Genome Research Inst., Whole Genome Ass‘n Studies (Feb. 8, 
2006), http://www.genome.gov/17516714. 
 4. See id. (detailing the 0.1 percent difference between individuals); see also Meurer, supra note 2, 
at 403 (outlining the benefits of pharmacogenomics).    
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961318
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However, pharmacogenomics is unlikely to fulfill the promise of providing 
―miracle drugs‖ to all.5 The pharmaceutical industry may be reluctant to pursue 
pharmacogenomics because of the costs associated with developing products for a 
segmented patient population,6 and the current regulatory and legal system may be 
ill-prepared to deal with the practical, economic, legal, and ethical issues associated 
with genetic discoveries.7 This article explores a number of dimensions of the 
problems associated with pharmacogenomic discoveries and considers the future of 
this exciting and complex field. 
A.  The History and Promise of Pharmacogenomics 
Genomics can be defined as ―the study of the function and structure of genes 
and gene products.‖8 Pharmacogenomics, a field within genomics, refers to the 
study of how an individual, based on his or her genetic makeup, responds to drugs, 
focusing on one‘s susceptibility to disease and response to drug therapies.9   
The history of pharmacogenomics started in the early twentieth century with a 
scientific concentration on Mendelian effects on drug response.10 The discipline of 
pharmacogenetics predated pharmacogenomics, and was first articulated by Arno 
Motulsky in 1957,11 who asserted that ―otherwise innocuous genetic traits‖ might 
underlie variation among individuals in drug response, based on individual 
differences in enzyme structure and function.12 Although the field of 
pharmacogenetics is relatively well-established, it has only recently had a 
significant impact on the pharmaceutical industry.13 
 
 5. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (explaining that the benefits of individually-
tailored drugs are overstated). 
 6. Meurer, supra note 2, at 401 (explaining the private returns and social costs associated with 
advancements in pharmacogenomics).  
 7. See Robertson et al., supra note 2, at 159–64 (reviewing a variety of regulatory challenges 
associated with pharmacogenomics). 
 8. Meurer, supra note 2, at 402. 
 9. David Housman & Fred D. Ledley, Why Pharmacogenomics? Why Now?, 16 NATURE 
BIOTECH. 2, 2 (Supp. 1998). It is important to ensure that pharmacogenomics is distinguished from 
predisposition or predictive testing, the latter of which ―provide[s] statistical inferences concerning the 
risk of a disease or its prognosis.‖ Id. More specifically within pharmacogenomics, pharmacokinetics is 
defined as the study of the variation in drug metabolism, while pharmacodynamics is the mechanism of 
a drug on its target. Andrew Marshall, Laying the Foundations for Personalized Medicines, 16 NATURE 
BIOTECH. 6, 6–7 (Supp. 1998).   
 10. David B. Goldstein et al., Pharmacogenetics Goes Genomic, 4 NATURE REV. GENETICS 937 
(2003). Gregor Mendel ―discovered‖ the laws of genetics in 1865 with his famous studies of the heredity 
of traits in pea pod plants. Salvatore Giorgianni, Solving the Mysteries of Inheritance, PFIZER J., 
Summer 1998, at 1, 1. His discoveries were generally ignored until the next century, when they were 
―rediscovered‖ and applied over a number of disciplines. Id.  
 11. Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 937.  
 12. Arno G. Motulsky, Drug Reactions, Enzymes, and Biochemical Genetics, 165 JAMA 835, 835 
(1957).  
 13. See Housman & Ledley, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining recent developments contributing to the 
significance of pharmacogenetics). 
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The terms pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics are often used 
interchangeably;14 however, it is necessary to understand that a distinction exists.  
Some merely define pharmacogenomics as the ensuing broadening of 
pharmacogenetics.15 While pharmacogenetics applies to the reaction of genetically 
diverse patients to a particular medicine (―one drug across many genomes‖),16 
pharmacogenomics encompasses pharmacogenetics, but also applies at earlier 
phases of drug development, in determining which compounds will be most 
effective for a particular genome (―many drugs across one genome‖).17 
Pharmacogenetics is most useful for already-available drugs, in that it can be 
applied to existing drugs and development programs; in contrast, 
―pharmacogenomics will exert its impact at the drug discovery stage and will thus 
appear in products over the long term.‖18   
Regardless of their definitional distinctions, the goals of both 
pharmacogenomics and pharmacogenetics are identical:  
[T]o improve the diagnosis of genetic disease; to develop drugs to 
fight genetic disease; to make clinical testing of drugs more efficient 
by identifying populations in which the drugs are likely to be 
especially efficacious . . . and, using genetic information about 
patients, to maximize therapeutic benefit and minimize harmful side 
effects by prescribing drugs to targeted patient populations.19 
In the area of drug discovery and development, pharmacogenomics promises 
to offer better matching between patients and the appropriate drugs and to reduce or 
 
 14. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PHARMACOGENETICS: ETHICAL ISSUES 4 tbl.1.1 (2003). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.; Jai Shah, Concept and Putative Application of Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics, 
HEALTH L. REV., no. 2, 2004 at 3, 4. 
 17. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 4 tbl.1.1; Shah, supra note 16, at 3, 4. The 
World Health Organization provides the following distinction:  
Pharmacogenetics refers to the study of DNA sequence variation as it relates to 
differential drug response of individuals, i.e., the use of genomics to determine an 
individual‘s response. Pharmacogenomics refers to the use of DNA-based genotyping in 
order to target pharmaceutical agents to specific patient populations in the design of 
drugs.  
World Health Organization, Progress in Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics, 16 WHO DRUG 
INFO. 17, 17 (2002). Other commentators state that ―[p]harmacogenetics is the application of single gene 
sequence or a limited set of multiple gene sequences to study variation in DNA sequences related to 
drug action or drug disposition,‖ while ―[p]harmacogenomics is the application of genome-wide single-
nucleotide polymorphism maps and genome-wide gene expression analysis to study variations that 
influence drug action.‖ Jack E. Urquhart et al., The Duty to Use Pharmacogenetics and 
Pharmacogenomics to Reduce the Risk of Idiosyncratic Drug-Induced Liver Injury, FINDLAW (Mar. 
2004), http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Feb/27/133310.html (citing Lawrence Lesko et al., 
Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics in Drug Development and Regulatory Decision Making: 
Report of the First FDA-PWG-PhRMA-DruSafe Workshop, 43 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 342, 343–
44 (2003)). 
 18. Shah, supra note 16, at 4. 
 19. LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 423 (2002).  
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eliminate adverse effects,20 enabling correct dosage according to one‘s particular 
metabolism.   
1.  Designer Drugs, Adverse Drug Reactions, and Metabolism 
The promise most commonly associated with pharmacogenomics is the 
advancement of new ―designer drugs‖ that may be developed to meet an 
individual‘s particular health needs, thereby increasing a drug‘s effectiveness.21 
The completion of the HGP was accompanied by the potential for the development 
of ―individualized medicine,‖22 and it has been suggested that applying genetic 
knowledge to drug development is as simple as ―start[ing] backwards and 
build[ing] a drug that addresses the problem.‖23 Clinical researchers identify drug 
targets or pathway proteins as potential objectives for pharmacogenomic drug 
development.24 For example, variations in one gene (GNB3) are associated with a 
response to antidepressants, while variations in another (AGT) are associated with 
reduction of blood pressure with anti-hypertensive treatment.25   
Dr. Craig Venter, one of the major players behind the HGP, has predicted that 
eventually each of us ―might carry something similar to a bar code that identifies 
our genotype, and this would help us make healthcare decisions.‖26 For example, 
since the late 1990‘s, pharmacogenetics has been used to predict the effectiveness 
of Herceptin, a drug for metastatic breast cancer.27 Herceptin is especially effective 
in shrinking tumors and extending lives for approximately thirty percent of breast 
cancer patients—those whose tumors have unusually high amounts of the 
HER2/neu protein.28 The use of Herceptin illustrates the ability to identify drugs 
according to an individual‘s genetic profile; it is now considered the standard of 
 
 20. Meurer, supra note 2, at 401. 
 21. See id. at 401 (noting the potential for individualized drugs from pharmacogenomics); see also 
D.C. Wertz, Ethical, Social and Legal Issues in Pharmacogenomics, 3 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 194, 194 
(2003) (discussing the promise of designing drugs for custom medicines). Currently, most drugs have an 
average effectiveness rate of 50 percent. Lawrence J. Lesko & Issam Zineh, DNA, Drugs & Chariots: 
On a Decade of Pharmacogenomics at the US FDA, 11 PHARMACOGENOMICS 507, 511 (2010). 
 22. Henry T. Greely, Pharmacogenomics: Promise, Prospects, and Potential Problems, MED. 
ETHICS, Winter 2002, at 2. 
 23. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR GENES: WHY THEY MATTER MORE 
THAN YOU THINK 303–04 (1998). The authors state, ―[i]ndividual DNA sequences, combined with 
existing computer modeling techniques, would allow drugs to be as precise as a key in a lock.‖ Id.  
 24. See Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 940 tbl.1a (providing examples of common drug targets 
and pathway proteins that are associated with drug response). 
 25. Id. 
 26. J. Craig Venter, The Genome Project – From Microbes to Man, PFIZER J., Summer 1998, at 7, 
11. 
 27. The Making of the Pharmacogenomic Prescription, GENE LETTER (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://www.geneletter.com/the-making-of-the-pharmacogenomic-prescription-22/ (―[T]ests are 
performed to predict whether it will work in a particular patient prior to drug prescription.‖). 
 28. Shah, supra note 16, at 6.  
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care for that particular form of breast cancer.29 Pharmacogenomics is also currently 
used in Alzheimer‘s disease research.30 For instance, one study investigated the 
relationship between Alzheimer‘s patients‘ genotypes and their response to certain 
already-existing drugs, and found that a certain gene is a good predictor of response 
to tacrine, a cholinesterase inhibitor.31  
The second promise of pharmacogenomics is the reduction of adverse drug 
reactions (ADRs). Fatal ADRs are considered to be between the fourth and sixth 
leading causes of death,32 accounting for approximately three percent of all deaths 
in the general population.33 Moreover, it is estimated that ADRs cost society over 
100 billion dollars per year.34 Applying pharmacogenomics to drug development 
and prescription could potentially reduce the risk of adverse drug reactions such as 
venous thrombosis, which is associated with the factor V Leiden allele.35 Because 
the use of oral contraceptives by women with the factor V Leiden allele greatly 
increases the risk of venous thrombosis, it might be possible to test women for the 
allele before making prescription decisions.36 Likewise, would-be abacavir users 
for the treatment of HIV infection could be tested for the HLA-B*5701 allele, so as 
to reduce the incidence of hypersensitivity reactions to the use of the drug.37 
 
 29. Penelope K. Manasco & Teresa E. Arledge, Drug Development Strategies, in 
PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 83, 96 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 
2003). 
 30. See Roses, supra note 2, at 860 (identifying gene mutations associated with Alzheimer‘s 
disease). 
 31. Andrew Marshall, Getting the Right Drug into the Right Patient, 16 NATURE BIOTECH., 9, 9 
(Supp. 1998) (citing Judes Poirier et al., Apolipoprotein E4 Allele as a Predictor of Cholinergic Deficits 
and Treatment Outcome in Alzheimer‟s Disease, 92 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 12260 (1995)). 
 32. Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-
analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1998) (using data collected from 1994 to find 
that ADRs are responsible for 100,000 drug-related deaths and 2.2 million hospitalizations each year in 
the U.S.). See also Karin Wester et al., Incidence of Fatal Adverse Drug Reactions: A Population Based 
Study, 65 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 573, 576 (2008) (finding that fatal ADRs was the seventh 
most common cause of death in Sweden).  
 33. Wester et al., supra note 32, at 576. 
 34. Faith Lagay, Pharmacogenomics: Revolution in a Bottle?, VIRTUAL MENTOR (Mar. 2002), 
http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2002/03/gnth1-0203.html. See also SAM TETLOW, CAMBRIDGE 
HEALTHTECH INST., SUCCESSFUL PHARMACOGENOMICS BUSINESS MODELS 4 (2002) (estimating that 
the computed ADR cost in 1992 was 76.6 billion dollars); David J. Wu, A Pharmacogenomics Standard 
for FDA Drug Approval: Arbitrary and Capricious or Safe and Effective?, 23 BIOTECH. L. REP. 733, 
733 (2004) (citing annual cost estimates for ADRs at 30.1 to 136.8 billion dollars). 
 35. Muin J. Khoury & Jill Morris, Pharmacogenomics and Public Health: The Promise of Targeted 
Disease Prevention, OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20090421103558/http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/training/perspectives/factsht
s/pharmacofs.htm (last updated Nov. 17, 2007) (explaining that while genetic testing to locate V Leiden 
allele would be medically and scientifically useful, it would also be very costly). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Kathy L. Hudson, Genomics, Health Care, and Society, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1033, 1036–37 
tbl.2 (2011); Simon Mallal et al., Association Between Presence of HLA-B*5701, HLA-DR7, and HLA-
DQ3 and Hypersensitivity to HIV-1 Reverse-Transcriptase Inhibitor Abacavir, 359 LANCET 727, 731 
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The study of genetics could also clarify why people respond differently to 
medications and how a person‘s body metabolizes particular compounds.38 The 
manner by which an individual metabolizes certain drugs may depend on a set of 
genes separate and unrelated from those correlated to any particular illness that is 
present throughout the population.39 Simply put, certain genes have an impact on 
metabolic rates.40 Because of genetic variations in metabolism, pharmacogenomic 
discoveries may cause the drug prescription process to change.41 Instead of 
determining dosages by weight, age, and other proxies, physicians will be able to 
prescribe according to an individual‘s genetic makeup, thereby ―maximiz[ing] the 
therapy‘s value and decreas[ing] the likelihood of overdose.‖42   
For example, the D2 receptor gene, DRD2, is associated with the metabolism 
of certain antipsychotics.43 Likewise, if an individual carries the variant cytochrome 
P450 gene, CYP2D6, which encodes a metabolic liver enzyme, he or she cannot 
metabolize certain compounds, which could therefore allow lethal amounts of a 
drug to accumulate in his or her body.44 It is claimed that ―[u]p to 30% of patients 
do not respond optimally to certain drugs.‖45 If an individual‘s rate of metabolism 
is too high, a patient will be undertreated because the drugs will not be delivered in 
an efficacious manner.46 If metabolism is too low, it could lead to an overdose 
 
(2002); Seth Hetherington et al., Genetic Variations in HLA-B Region and Hypersensitivity Reactions to 
Abacavir, 359 LANCET 1121, 1121 (2002).  
 38. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 12 tbl.2.1. 
 39. As the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, an independent charitable body based in the UK, 
explains, these genes do not necessarily have an effect on an individual‘s susceptibility to disease, but 
how the person absorbs, metabolizes, and excretes compounds. Id.  
 40. See, e.g., Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 941 tbl.1b (providing a table of pharmacogenetic 
variants and their impacts on metabolism). 
 41. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 18. 
 42. Devesh D. Gosavi & Ganapat J. Pawar, Pharmacogenomics: Promises and Challenges, 2 INT‘L 
J. RES. PHARMACEUTICAL BIOMED. SCI. 1444, 1445 (2011). 
 43. Yoshio Yamanouchi et al., Effect of DRD2, 5-HT2A, and COMT Genes on Antipsychotic 
Response to Risperidone, 3 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 356, 356, 358–59 (2003). One—perhaps now 
outdated—table on genetic polymorphisms of human drug-metabolizing enzymes and transporters 
(those genetic variations that are currently known to be susceptible to drug variations) is available 
online. William E. Evans & Mary V. Relling, Pharmacogenomics: Translating Functional Genomics 
into Rational Therapeutics, 286 SCI. 487, 489 tbl.1 (1999), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/286/5439/487.full.pdf. 
 44. Wu, supra note 34, at 733. Other examples of prescribing particular dosages according to one‘s 
metabolism in order to reduce adverse events include risk reduction strategies such as HIV resistance 
testing and optimized dosing for HCV. See Jianming Tang & Richard A. Kaslow, Pharmacogenomic 
Perspectives of Chronic Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) Infection, 4 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 171, 172 (2004) 
(reviewing the use of pharmacogenomics to improve dosing for HCV treatment); The Making of the 
Pharmacogenomic Prescription, supra note 27 (discussing how pharmacogenomics is used for HIV 
resistance testing). 
 45. Nusrat Khaleeli & Dennis Fernandez, Patent Prosecution in Pharmacogenomics, 88 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 83, 88 (2006) (claiming that almost a third of patients respond less than ideally 
to some pharmaceuticals). 
 46. Greely, supra note 22, at 1. 
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because the site will be overdelivered.47 In other words, the ultra-rapid metabolism 
of a drug can cause it to be ineffective and slow, or non-metabolism of a drug can 
result in the accumulation of toxic amounts of the compound in the body.   
Thus, physicians could modify an individual‘s prescription according to 
multiple sets of genes and their interactions,48 in order to increase the probability of 
optimal dosage.49 According to Janet Woodcock, Director of the Food and Drug 
Administration‘s (FDA) Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the 
variability in how individuals metabolize compounds is ―a huge problem, because 
what‘s considered a normal dose of a drug can be toxic for some people.‖50 She 
praises the advantages of using pharmacogenomics to determine dosages according 
to a patient‘s genetic profile.51   
2.  Diagnosis, Treatment, and Categorization of Disease 
Further, pharmacogenomics promises that our knowledge of the biology 
underlying illness will increase through the identification of susceptibility genes, 
which might lead to a better understanding of gene products.52 This, in turn, will 
trigger greater awareness of the role of individual proteins in causing illness, 
thereby leading to further appreciation of the interaction of these proteins with 
other substances, as well as the effect of the environment on protein levels and 
function.53 These developments may result in new forms of diagnosis, treatment, 
and possibly prevention of many illnesses and disorders.54 
Although this article primarily focuses on the intersection of 
pharmacogenomics and the drug development process, diagnosis is another area in 
which genetic discoveries may have a significant impact. Currently, the process of 
diagnosis can be quite haphazard, and the trial-and-error method common in the 
experience of most physicians and patients can take its toll.55 Take, for instance, 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See DAVID MELZER ET AL., MY VERY OWN MEDICINE: WHAT MUST I KNOW: INFORMATION 
POLICY FOR PHARMACOGENETICS 53 (2003) (according to one study, 59 percent of drugs are 
―metabolised by at least one enzyme that has a variant allele known to cause poor metabolism‖); see 
also NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 88 (expressing concerns that doctors will 
group individuals by ethnicity and will refuse to prescribe medications just because they were found to 
be ineffective in others of the same ethnic group). 
 49. See Khaleeli & Fernandez, supra note 45, at 87–88 (finding that a goal of pharmacogenomics is 
to identify individual patients and ensure appropriate medication dosages). 
 50. Tracy Hampton, FDA Seeks Genome-Based Drug Data, 291 JAMA 32, 32–33 (2004). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Nick Craddock & Ian Jones, Genetics of Bipolar Disorder, 36 J. MED. GENETICS 585, 592 
(1999).  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. See, e.g., Maree L. Inder et al., ―I Really Don‟t Know Whether it is Still There”: Ambivalent 
Acceptance of a Diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder, 81 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 157, 157 (2010) (describing the 
haphazard diagnosis among individuals with bipolar disorder).  
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bipolar disorder, a mental illness that affects 3.9 percent of the American 
population in their lifetime, with an average age-of-onset of 25 years.56 It is one of 
the most fatal of all illnesses, with a suicide rate of up to 20 percent.57 One survey 
found that although 26.2 percent of adults may have some sort of mental illness 
within a given year, only 12 percent receive minimally adequate treatment.58 This 
low rate of success is telling of the historical ―needle-in-a-haystack‖ process of 
diagnosis. The isolation of genes that predispose certain individuals to particular 
illnesses will lead to an improvement in the understanding of the causes and 
mechanisms of the illnesses themselves.59 For example, mental health physicians 
began to see this improvement during the revisions of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in the 1980‘s, as the definitions shifted 
away from psychoanalytic assumptions toward a more standardized biology-based 
approach.60   
Moreover, the process of identifying the right dosage and combination of 
medications can be extraordinarily slow and discouraging, and it can take months, 
or even years, to determine the most effective treatment regimen for many 
diseases.61 For example, the Surgeon General‘s Office reported that approximately 
30 to 50 percent of patients diagnosed with major depressive episodes do not 
respond to their original medication.62 It has been argued that genetic discoveries 
will allow us to develop a ―molecular taxonomy of disease,‖63 or ―a rational, 
aetiology-based classification of . . . disorders which will almost certainly provide a 
much better guide to treatment and prognosis than do current classifications.‖64   
 
 56. Bipolar Disorder Among Adults, NAT‘L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/1BIPOLAR_ADULT.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2012); Liberty 
Fajutrao et al., A Systematic Review of the Evidence of the Burden of Bipolar Disorder in Europe, 5 
CLINICAL PRAC. & EPIDEMIOLOGY MENTAL HEALTH 3 (2009), 
http://w09.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1745-0179-5-3.pdf. 
 57. Peter M. Brigham, The Psychopharmacology of Bipolar Disorder, 
http://home.comcast.net/~pmbrig/BP_pharm.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 58. Any Disorder Among Adults¸ NAT‘L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics//1ANYDIS_ADULT.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).  
 59. Nicholas J. Schork, Genetics of Complex Disease: Approaches, Problems, and Solutions, 156 
AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. S103, S105 (Supp. 1997) (describing that the study of 
genetics could lead to investigations into: ―(1) the frequency of the deleterious gene in the population, 
(2) the effect of the gene in the presence of other factors . . . [and] (3) the impact of public health and 
health economics of the gene if its effects were ameliorated‖).  
 60. See Rick Mayes & Allan V. Horwitz, DSM-III and the Revolution in Classification of Mental 
Illness, 41 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 249, 264 (2005) (detailing how the DSM-III help diagnosticians move 
away from psychoanalysis to the more dominant symptom-based approach to diagnosing mental 
disorders).  
 61. P.C. Carder et al., Negotiating Medications: Patient Perceptions of Long-Term Medication Use, 
28 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 409, 412 (2003).  
 62. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 263 (1999). 
 63. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xvii.     
 64. Craddock & Jones, supra note 52, at 592. 
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Indeed, the discovery of genes that confer vulnerability to an illness could 
establish multiple and distinct biological causes for the same symptoms, thus 
creating new categories of an overarching illness.65 These subcategories could have 
diverse molecular and environmental causes, while being manifested in similar 
physical or behavioral symptoms.66 Thus, in the future, diagnosis could be 
categorized by the individual‘s biological interactions or one‘s predetermined 
reactions to certain medications. For example, the current categories of cancer—
based on location and type of tumor—may become obsolete, as the understanding 
of the molecular biology of illness improves.   
B.  The Complexity of Pharmacogenomics 
An important disclaimer is necessary: pharmacogenomics is not as simple as 
analyzing one‘s genetic makeup to make drug dosage and prescription decisions.67 
Pharmacogenomics does not promise perfectly individualized medicine; it will only 
accelerate the process of tailoring treatment decisions to one‘s genetic 
predispositions.68 As researchers have focused on the probabilistic nature of 
genetics, it is becoming clearer that the most common illnesses, if genetic, are 
compounded by drug interactions and environmental and physiological factors such 
as nutrition, aging, and liver and kidney function.69 Thus, the application of 
 
 65. Many believe that ―it is likely that some conditions which are now considered to be single 
disorders, with a common set of symptoms, will be discovered to be more heterogeneous, with several 
different biochemical disorders leading to a common set of clinical features.‖ NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xviii. 
 66. See generally id.  
 67. See generally Daniel W. Nebert & Elliot S. Vessell, Advances in Pharmacogenomics and 
Individualized Drug Therapy: Exciting Challenges that Lie Ahead, 500 EUR. J. PHARMACOLOGY 267 
(2004) (describing the many challenges and factors effecting the success of pharmacogenomics). 
 68. See, e.g., TANYA M. LUHRMANN, OF TWO MINDS: THE GROWING DISORDER IN AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRY 48 (2000) (discussing the problem of genetic predispositions and the uncertainty of non-
individualized medicine). 
 69. See MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 53; see also Pat Buckley & Ross A. McKinnon, 
Pharmacogenomics, Ethics, and the Community, 23 PHARMACIST 23, 23 (2004) (―The probabilistic 
nature of pharmacogenomics needs to be appreciated when considering whether its application will 
increase inequalities in the provision of health care. Pharmacogenomic tests are unlikely to indicate that 
a particular medicine will definitely be effective or ineffective in a particular patient. Rather, they are 
likely to provide probabilistic information . . . .‖). The FDA guidance to industry regarding the 
submission of pharmacogenomic data is clear on the interaction between genes, the environment, and 
other assorted factors, stating, ―[i]n most instances, a genotype or particular gene expression profile is 
likely to be one of a number of factors that affects the probability of an adverse event or a favorable 
response. For this reason, pharmacogenomic biomarkers can ordinarily be handled like other non-
genomic predictive markers in the clinical arena.‖ FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS 16 (2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 FDA GUIDANCE]. See also Marshall, supra note 9, at 7 (―More often than not, several 
genes, rather than one, interact with environmental factors to result in a particular variation in drug 
action.‖). 
Koch.JHCLP.15.2.publisher  
272 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 15:263 
pharmacogenomics is likely much more complicated than some members of the 
media and public hope and claim.70   
The ultimate promise of effective, personalized, tailor-made medicine, with 
fewer side effects and more appropriate dosage, is tantalizing. However, there are a 
number of issues that must be considered to proactively approach and anticipate 
potential innovations and their implications rather than ―trying to implement 
retroactive changes.‖71   
Many of the problems encountered when considering the impact of 
pharmacogenomics on society are multilayered and complex, and involve a myriad 
of ethical, legal, and policy-related considerations. This article focuses on the role 
of industry in furthering pharmacogenomic developments and the dimensions of 
current regulatory and legislative decision-making in the discipline.72 The 
discussion of the impact of pharmacogenomics would be incomplete without 
addressing how theories of liability may change, or be changed, by 
pharmacogenomic developments.73   
II.  PHARMACOGENOMIC DRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT  
A.  Industry Reluctance to Pursue Pharmacogenomics 
Pharmaceutical companies may be reluctant to use pharmacogenomics to 
develop potentially beneficial drugs and therapies because of the limited financial 
benefit associated with drug development for smaller stratified patient populations. 
These companies may be hesitant to pursue pharmacogenomics at all due to its 
inherently unprofitability.74 Some critics assert that companies that sell the most 
products that are ineffective for many consumers/patients have the least incentive to 
do research to identify more effective drugs that will draw market share away from 
their one-size-fits-all drugs.75 Companies with successful blockbuster drugs may be 
cautious about pursuing pharmacogenomic research because alternative drugs may 
only benefit a small portion of the population.76 Pharmacogenomic developments 
 
 70. For example, one commentator, in a critique of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics‘ report on 
pharmacogenetics, concluded that ―expert opinion is less optimistic as the complexities of gene/gene, 
and gene/environment interaction have become more apparent.‖ Oonagh Patricia Corrigan, 
Pharmacogenetics, Ethical Issues: Review of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report, 31 J. MED. 
ETHICS 144, 146 (2005). 
 71. Barbara Ann Binzak, How Pharmacogenomics Will Impact the Federal Regulation of Clinical 
Trials and the New Drug Approval Process, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103, 104 (2003). 
 72. See infra Parts II–III. 
 73. See infra Part III.C. 
 74. Karen Peterson-Iyer, Pharmacogenomics, Ethics, and Public Policy, 18 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS 
J. 35, 39 (2008). 
 75. Barbara J. Evans et al., Creating Incentives for Genomics Research to Improve Targeting of 
Therapies, 10 NATURE MED. 1289, 1291 (2004).  
 76. See Peterson-Iyer, supra note 74, at 39; see also Pharmacogenomics: Medicine and the New 
Genetics, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO., 
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could lead to market segmentation by increasing research and development (R&D) 
costs without raising profits.77 Income estimates for smaller, targeted patient 
markets run 300 to 500 million dollars rather than the one billion dollars generally 
associated with blockbuster drugs.78 Thus, companies may bypass the use of 
pharmacogenomics to develop potentially beneficial drugs and therapies because of 
the perceived limited financial benefit.79   
However, if a rival company manufactures a drug that is obviously more 
effective than the current blockbuster drug, people may stop buying the ineffective 
one, thereby forcing sponsors of big-name drugs to focus on targeted drug 
development in order to compete in the market. In other words, differentiating 
drugs according to effectiveness in subpopulations may lead to increased 
competition among companies.80   
Even as it might fight it, industry is anticipating change, admitting that ―[t]he 
era of the blockbuster is ending.‖81 However, it is unclear how ―the drug industry 
will metamorphose itself.‖82 In fact, the configuration of the industry may shift so 
much that Robert Freeman, the former Executive Director of Public Policy at 
AstraZeneca, acknowledged, ―[w]e simply don‘t know what kind of business 
model is necessary to commercialize personalized medicine.‖83 Some 
pharmaceutical companies have actively begun pursuing pharmacogenomic 
research.84 For example, GlaxoSmithKline ―has played a prominent role in 
 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/medicine/pharma.shtml (last visited April 12, 
2012) [hereinafter HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO]. 
 77. Corrigan, supra note 70, at 145.  
 78. Wu, supra note 34, at 743.  
 79. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 29.  
 80. Commentators have noted big pharmaceutical companies‘ reluctance to enter the 
pharmacogenomics market, but have conceded that although ―[i]ncreased attention to cost effectiveness 
tends to reward well-targeted therapies for their low rates of treatment failure . . . drugs need only 
outperform a standard or reference drug, which could itself be poorly targeted.‖ Evans et al., supra note 
75, at 1290.   
 81. Pamela Sherrid, Is There a Market for Personal Medicine?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 
2003, at 56, 56. Six of the ten most successful blockbuster drugs are scheduled to go off-patent in the 
near future, including Pfizer‘s Lipitor. Chris Woolston, Blockbuster-Drug Prices to Drop as Patents 
Expire, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/25/news/la-heb-generics-drug-
prices-20110725. 
 82. Sherrid, supra note 81.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Amber L. Beitelshees & David L. Veenstra, Evolving Research and Stakeholder Perspectives 
on Pharmacogenomics, 306 JAMA 1252, 1252 (2011) (citing recent studies including one by 
GlaxoSmithKline investigators, which ―has identified major histocompatibility complex genetic variants 
associated with liver damage in response to lapatinib, which is already Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) approved for the treatment of breast cancer,‖ another in which the ―epidermal growth factor 
receptor (EGFR) tyrosine kinase inhibitors erlotinib and gefitinib recently [was] shown to be more 
effective in patients with non–small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) who have certain EGFR tumor 
mutations,‖ and a third by Pfizer to develop a drug ―(crizotinib) for NSCLC, which is projected to be 
indicated for 3% to 5% of patients with an EML4-ALK fusion gene variation‖). By 1998, three major 
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promoting pharmacogenetics, with company scientists producing a number of 
scientific papers in high profile science and medical journals urging the uptake of 
pharmacogenetics.‖85   
B.  Advantages of Using Pharmacogenomics in Drug Development 
1.  Potential Cost-Saving Measures  
Drug R&D is expensive and relatively haphazard. In 2010, industry spent an 
estimated 67.4 billion dollars on pharmaceutical R&D.86 The Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the pharmaceutical trade 
association, estimates the average cost to develop a drug at 1.3 billion dollars.87 It 
currently takes an average of ten to fifteen years for a company to develop a drug.88 
Since most drugs do not make it to market, the profits from one product must make 
up for the losses incurred for failed compounds.89  
Furthermore, only one of ―60,000 compounds synthesized by pharmaceutical 
companies‖ can be considered ―highly successful.‖90 Success is currently measured 
by the amount earned; ―highly successful‖ blockbuster drugs have annual global 
sales over one billion dollars.91  
A study by the Boston Consulting Group asserts that companies that are 
hesitant to enter the ―genomics revolution head on‖ will suffer the consequences, 
rendering them unable to compete in the market with those that do.92 According to 
one estimate, the incorporation of pharmacogenomics into drug development could 
 
companies–Genset, Celera Genomics, and Incyte Genetics–had already begun preparations to undertake 
systematic searches of the genome for variants or single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and a 
number of other companies had been created in order to develop molecular diagnostics. Jeanette J. 
McCarthy & Rolf Hilfiker, The Use of Single-Nucleotide Polymorphism Maps in Pharmacogenomics, 
18 NATURE BIOTECH. 505, 505 (2000). 
 85. Corrigan, supra note 70, at 145.  
 86. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 2011 PROFILE 10 (2011). 
 87. Id. This estimate is highly contentious. See, e.g., Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, 
Demythologizing the High Cost of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 36, 38–39 (2011) 
(critiquing the high costs associated research and development of new drugs). 
 88. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM, supra note 86, at 12 fig.4. 
 89. ―Only about one in six drug candidates that enter clinical trials are ultimately submitted to and 
approved by the FDA, according to a study of the 50 largest companies.‖ Id. at 10.  
 90. C.E. Reeder & W. Michael Dickson, Economic Implications of Pharmacogenomics, in 
PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 229, 230 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 
2003). 
 91. Michael N. Liebman, Personalised Medicine: End of the Blockbuster?, 9 PHARMA FOCUS ASIA, 
no. 9, 2008 at 4, 8.  
 92. PETER TOLLMAN ET AL., BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., A REVOLUTION IN R&D: HOW GENOMICS 
AND GENETICS ARE TRANSFORMING THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21 (2001).  
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lead to a reduction in the cost and time of drug development, saving up to 45 
percent of clinical drug development costs.93  
Pharmacogenomics can be applied at every phase in the drug development 
process, and companies may be able to save substantial R&D costs and speed up 
the drug approval process because of the ability to reduce the population in which 
the drug is tested, leading to more reliable findings, ostensibly faster institutional 
review board (IRB) review and approval, and safer trials.94 Individuals for whom 
the drug in question is less likely to be effective, or those for whom the drug may 
have deleterious side effects, can be excluded from the various stages of clinical 
trials, thereby improving the protection of participants in human research.95 
Moreover, the ―selection of smaller groups of genetically homogenous participants 
in clinical trials may be advantageous, leading to more robust and reliable scientific 
findings regarding the group of patients who might eventually be prescribed the 
medicine.‖96   
Reducing the failure rate could ―far outweigh the negatives of market 
segmentation,‖ according to Nicholas Dracopoli, the former Vice President of 
Clinical Discovery Technologies at Bristol-Myers Squibb.97 A drug guaranteed to 
work on the percentage of the population ―for whom other drugs are ineffective or 
cause harmful side effects will return steady revenue at a premium price‖—
resulting in the development of reliable ―mini-busters.‖98 Currently, blockbusters 
are the biggest source of revenue for many drug companies, but ―mini-busters‖ 
 
 93. Reeder & Dickson, supra note 90, at 231 (estimating 45 percent savings of clinical drug 
development costs). Another group estimates the cost of developing a new medicine to be reduced to 
about 60 percent of the cost. TOLLMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 12 (estimating a savings of 300 million 
dollars from an average 880 million dollars in costs). 
 94. Marshall, supra note 31, at 12 (asserting several rewards of pharmacogenomics such as quicker 
development and increased financial pay-offs for pharmaceutical companies). Goldstein et al., states: 
One motivation for pharmacogenetic testing during drug development is that the 
stratification of patients by genotype might allow the identification of responses that would 
have been missed in an unselected cohort. This could allow efficacy for subgroups to be 
shown in drugs that might not have been considered effective in general populations, 
which could potentially improve the success rate of compounds. Because of the huge costs 
per patient of clinical trials, it has also been suggested that such streamlining might reduce 
the average cost of developing new compounds. 
Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 945. 
 95. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xiv. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Sherrid, supra note 81. 
 98. Lagay, supra note 34 (asserting that such drugs will return a steady revenue at a premium 
price); Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1289 (asserting that tailored treatments could generate new 
avenues for income); Catherine Schaffer, Pfizer Explores Rare Disease Path, 28 NATURE BIOTECH. 881, 
881 (2010) (defining ―mini-busters‖ as drugs which treat a small population by pharma standards, but 
can be charged at a premium due to the demand).   
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could replace the blockbusters with new, more genome-specific drugs.99 For 
example, pharmacogenomic discoveries ―threaten[ ] to shake up the lucrative 26 
billion dollar market for Statins—the big-selling products that help lower 
cholesterol in the blood and reduce the risk of heart attacks and strokes.‖100 
However, the view that pharmacogenomics will lead to more efficacious, 
reliable, and safe clinical trials because of more targeted trial studies is not without 
its detractors.101 For example, some believe that ―the small size of 
pharmacogenetics studies renders them unconvincing.‖102 In addition, the restricted 
trial populations will limit the claims a company can make on a drug to the FDA.103 
This may affect the licenses FDA may grant, because approval will only be related 
to the particular population in the pivotal trials.104 The restriction of FDA approval 
to specific patient groups could implicate a significant problem already plaguing 
FDA, that of off-label prescription.105   
2.  Saving Shelved Drugs 
Pharmacogenomics may also enable the re-marketing of ―shelved‖ drugs that 
are rarely, if ever, prescribed because of an inability to determine for whom the 
drugs work or because they cause adverse reactions in some patients.106 Between 
January 1, 1971 and May 31, 2006, over three percent of drugs approved by FDA 
were withdrawn due to unacceptable side effects.107 Genetic tests may be able to 
revive such drugs that were withdrawn from the market.108 The identification of a 
 
 99. See Javier Barrios-González & Roxana U. Miranda, Biotechnological Production and 
Application of Statins, 85 APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY & BIOTECH. 869, 869 (2010) (stating that the two 
highest selling drugs in the United States in 2006 were statins).    
 100. Genes Play Role In Who Benefits From Statin—In Boost to „Personalize Medicine,‟ Study Links 
Patient Genetics with Efficacy of Cholesterol Drug, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at D1. In one study, 
―[p]atients with a certain common genetic variant had a 22% smaller drop in total cholesterol and a 19% 
smaller drop in LDL or ‗bad‘ cholesterol than those patients without the variant.‖ Id. 
 101. See MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 33 (questioning the generalizability of 
pharmacogenomics in pre-licensing drug trials). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 34–35 (assessing the issues created by a smaller target population in detecting unusual 
adverse events).  
 104. See id. (detailing the uncertainty surrounding the regulatory guidelines for pharmacogenetic 
products). 
 105. See infra Part III.A.2.b. 
 106. Greely, supra note 22, at 2. 
 107. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO THE NATION 2005: 
IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS 49 (2005) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE NATION].  
 108. Meurer, supra note 2, at 401. One commentator highlighted the anti-epileptic drug felbamate in 
order to clarify the use of pharmacogenomics to reduce ADRs. Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 945. 
The drug was approved in 1993, after it was demonstrated that it helped control seizures. Id. During a 
clinical investigation, there was no evidence of clinically significant blood or liver disorders related to 
use of the drug. Id. However, 34 cases of aplastic anaemia and 23 cases of hepatic failure, with 18 
reported fatalities, were reported in the first year after licensing. Id. It is believed that these ADRs and 
associated deaths were related to the metabolism of the drug. Id. The authors contend that ―[t]he ability 
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―unique population . . . that benefits from a drug that once experienced lagging 
sales because of its ineffectiveness in the larger overall population‖ could mean that 
―the postmarketing use of pharmacogenomic data may be quite useful to a drug 
company.‖109   
Moreover, like those products that were shelved after FDA approval, drugs 
that had not made it through the approval process or were abandoned during 
development may also be given a second chance.110 Companies may take advantage 
of ―Lazarus‖ programs in which drugs that have failed to receive FDA approval 
due to high rates of ADRs or low efficacy can be ―resurrected and used to treat 
genetically selected responders.‖111 Thus, ―[p]reviously failed drug candidates may 
be revived as they are matched with the niche population they serve.‖112 In 
particular, drugs in Phase III trials may be ―rescued‖ due to a new ability to reduce 
the rate of toxicity or adverse events in the identified testing population.113 It has 
been predicted that although the big pharmaceutical companies may continue to 
abandon these drugs (―why try to rescue a failed compound when pipelines are 
overflowing with leads?‖), such drugs may present desirable opportunities for 
smaller biotech companies who choose to pursue licensing.114  
3.  Avoiding Scandal (and Harm to Patients) 
Companies may also be able to avoid scandals like that associated with the 
antiarthritic drug Vioxx. In 2004, Merck & Co. initiated the biggest voluntary drug 
recall in history  due to evidence that Vioxx raises the risk of heart attack and 
stroke.115 The recall incensed FDA critics, who have accused the FDA of lacking 
aggressiveness and ―foot-dragging‖ once a drug has entered the market.116 Agency 
 
to reliably predict which patients might be at risk of such reactions to felbamate might allow greater 
confidence in its use, and again make available a potentially valuable AED [anti-epileptic drug] for 
patients with epilepsy that can itself be life-threatening.‖ Id. This example is illustrative of the optimism 
many have for FDA-approved drugs that have been shelved due to adverse reactions. The authors claim 
that the economic incentives for ―unshelving‖ the drug could be well worth it, explaining that ―[i]f 
pharmacogenetic predictors of adverse events could prevent the exposure of genetically vulnerable 
patients and so preserve even a single drug, the costs of any large-scale research effort in 
pharmacogenetics could be fully recovered.‖ Id. 
 109. Binzak, supra note 71, at 126. 
 110. Andrew Marshall, One Drug Does Not Fit All, 16 NATURE BIOTECH. 1, 1 (Supp. 1998) 
(discussing ―Lazarus‖ programs in which products that had been shelved after not making it through the 
approval process). 
 111. Id. 
 112. HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO, supra note 78.   
 113. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 31. 
 114. Marshall, supra note 110, at 1. 
 115. See Recall of Merck Arthritis Drug Vioxx Recall Leads to New Questions on FDA Effectiveness, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 4, 2004), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-
Reports/2004/October/04/dr00026061.aspx?p=1 (reporting concerns surrounding the FDA approval 
process for pharmaceuticals). 
 116. Id.   
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response to the Vioxx debacle has included a focus on pharmacogenomics. Steven 
Galson, then-Acting Director of CDER, said that, among other things, FDA would 
―promot[e] research on pharmacogenetics to help identify people who might react 
adversely to drugs.‖117 Thus, with an increase in pharmacogenomic research, drugs 
companies like Merck may be less likely to lose money late in trials due to safety 
and efficacy problems (even after FDA has already approved the drug), and will 
therefore be able to avoid withdrawing a drug from the market and the concomitant 
negative press and profit loss.118   
C.  The Public and Private Sectors: Shifts and Collaborations 
Identifying resources for R&D is of primary significance to encouraging 
pharmacogenomic advancement. Generally, ―[f]ederal subsidies and public sector 
research . . . play significant roles stimulating the development of the first 
generation of genetic tests designed to customize drug therapy.‖119 Going forward, 
pharmacogenomics will continue to require public sector funding to encourage the 
private sector to develop tests for existing drugs.120 It may be necessary to either 
incentivize private sponsorship of drug development, or the government will need 
to provide greater federal subsidies.121 In particular, alternative sources of funding 
may be most needed where genetic tests ―are not widely adopted, when tests are 
designed for use with substitute drugs manufactured by different companies, or 
when the private cost of test development is high because of licensing costs.‖122 
 
 117. Id.   
 118. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1289. 
 119. Meurer, supra note 2, at 401, 425 (―Thus far, public sector funding and R&D have been critical 
to the creation and deployment of pharmacogenomic innovations.‖). 
 120. Id. at 401, 425–26 (suggesting that funding from the public sector will further the goals of 
pharmacogenomics).  
 121. A Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (―PhRMA‖) report explained: 
[A]ccording to the National Institutes of Health (NIH), public dollars are not funding the 
research leading to new medicines. In fact, only 4 of the 47 top-selling drugs considered by 
NIH in its study to determine if American public investments were funding new drug 
development were developed in part with NIH funding, and none [were] developed solely 
with public funds. 
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFGS. AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 5 (2004).  
 122. Meurer, supra note 2, at 425–26. Meurer concludes by recommending a number of options for 
the type of public subsidies that should be offered, stating:  
Presently, federal grants directly support public sector pharmacogenomic research, and 
indirectly support pharmacogenomics through subsidies encouraging the production of 
research inputs (like gene data) that are used in the development of genetic tests. The 
government can encourage adoption of genetic tests through drug law and health insurance 
regulation.  Finally, the drug laws may be used to subsidize the development of drugs 
designed to treat ―orphan genotypes.‖ 
Id. at 426.  
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However, data supports the conclusion that some R&D support for 
pharmacogenomics must shift from the public to the private sector.123   
Critics argue that economic considerations could lead to a differentiation 
between the research focus in the industrial and academic sectors.124 They 
recommend that the appropriate regulatory mechanisms ensure cooperation 
between sectors to facilitate the transfer of information and the development of 
pharmacogenomic technology.125 There are a few public-private collaborations 
already underway.126 The SNP Consortium, a non-profit foundation, was founded 
to provide public genomic data online, thereby facilitating genomic research.127 
Pharmaceutical and technology companies, academic research centers, and the 
Wellcome Trust have entered into a partnership ―to publish a high-density SNP 
map of the human genome.‖128 The database of over 3.1 million SNPs is 
maintained by Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory.129   
There have also been a number of agreements between pharmaceutical and 
biotech companies.130 A 2003 survey indicated an interest in pharmacogenomic 
collaborations by both small biotech companies that are generally involved in 
providing test kits and other technological innovation, and large pharmaceutical 
companies.131 In 1997, two other collaborations between companies involved a 25 
million dollar deal between Incyte Genomics and GlaxoSmithKline to form 
diaDEXUS, and a 42.5 million dollar agreement between Genset and Abbott to 
 
 123. See id. at 425 (―If pharmacogenomics fulfills its promise, then we should expect that, as this 
sector of the pharmaceutical industry matures, most of the R&D on genetic tests will shift to the private 
sector.‖); see also Beitelshees & Veenstra, supra note 84, at 1252 (―The pharmaceutical industry is 
increasingly using pharmacogenomic strategies to identify patient subgroups with improved benefit-risk 
profiles.‖). 
 124. Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 945. 
 125. Likewise, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommends that public-private partnerships be 
encouraged. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xiv.    
 126. See Arthur L. Holden, The SNP Consortium: Summary of a Private Consortium Effort to 
Develop an Applied Map of the Human Genome, 32 BIOTECHNIQUES S22, S22, S23 (Supp. 2002) 
(describing partnerships between private entities like the Wellcome Trust and public universities). 
 127. Id. at S22. 
 128. Celia M. Henry, Pharmacogenomics, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 37, 
39. In phase I of the HapMap project, ―[over] 1.1 million SNPs were genotyped in 270 individuals from 
4 worldwide populations.‖ Gudmunder A. Thorisson et al., The International HapMap Project Web Site, 
15 GENOME RES. 1592, 1592 (2005).  
 129. Int‘l HapMap Consortium, A Second Generation Human Haplotype Map of Over 3.1 Million 
SNPs, 449 NATURE 851 (2007). See also Groups Participating in the International HapMap Project, 
INT‘L HAPMAP PROJECT, http://snp.cshl.org/groups.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 130. See, e.g., Corrigan, supra note 70, at 145 (providing the example of a 20 million dollar alliance 
between the biotech company Genset and the pharmaceutical company Abbott Laboratories ―to analyze 
variations in patient responses to particular drug therapies‖). 
 131. Adam Hedgecoe & Paul Martin, The Drugs Don‟t Work: Expectations and the Shaping of 
Pharmacogenetics, 33 SOC. STUD. SCI. 327, 34243 (2003). 
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develop pharmacogenomics tests for gauging drug response.132 In 1998, deCODE 
Genetics and Roche entered into a 200 million dollar agreement ―to identify disease 
genes through genetic analysis of the uniquely homogenous Icelandic 
population.‖133 Pharmaceutical companies have also been encouraged to enter into 
agreements with biotech companies to develop test-drug combinations.134 Such 
arrangements are financially desirable because ―[w]here tests and drugs are 
intimately linked, as is in the case of new pharmacogenetic products, their 
evaluation needs to be co-ordinated and any licensing approval issued in concert‖ 
rather than separately.135   
Even if smaller companies do not enter into collaborations with ―big pharma,‖ 
the ―existence of ‗niche‘ therapeutic categories will present opportunities for 
smaller, genetics-based biotechnology firms to enter the market and produce the 
drugs.‖136 It has been hypothesized that the pharmaceutical industry may bifurcate 
into two separate sectors: those big pharmaceutical companies that will continue to 
pursue ―blockbuster‖ drugs for ―high-prevalence polymorphisms‖ and a ―second 
‗cottage‘ sector that serves the ‗orphan drug‘ market.‖137  
It will be interesting to see how the pharmaceutical industry adapts and 
changes with pharmacogenomic advances. The industry has been ―in a 
consolidation and merger phase, with ever larger corporations emerging at a steady 
pace.‖138 Since blockbuster drugs may no longer be the preferred treatment, 
companies may hone in on ―mini-busters,‖ thereby decreasing their size and the 
way they work with one another.139 
 
 
 132. Allen C. Nunnally et al., Intellectual Property and Commercial Aspects of Pharmacogenomics, 
in PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 109, 127–28 (Mark A. 
Rothstein ed., 2003). 
 133. Id. at 128. deCODE Genetics is an Icelandic company that endeavored to set up an Icelandic 
Health Sector Database (HSD) containing the medical records and genealogical and genetic data of all 
Icelanders. David E. Winickoff, Genome and Nation: Iceland‟s Health Sector Database and its Legacy, 
INNOVATIONS, 80, 80–81 (2006). 
 134. Companies have ―jumped on the technology, many of them merging with biotech companies 
that suddenly see a profitable product in the near future for the first time.‖ Lagay, supra note 35.   
 135. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 40. Herceptin is one example of a linked test-drug 
combination, as it requires administration of a test before it can be prescribed. However, ―[t]he test is not 
a true pharmacogenetic test, because it measures protein expression in a tumor rather than the underlying 
genetic makeup of the patient, but it shows the power of such tests.‖ Henry, supra note 128. 
 136. Reeder & Dickson, supra note 90, at 233. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Laviero Mancinelli et al., Pharmacogenomics: The Promise of Personalized Medicine, 2 AAPS 
PHARMSCI 1, 2 (2000), available at http://www.aapsj.org/articles/ps0201/ps020104/ps020104.pdf.  
 139. See id. (explaining that the ―one drug fits all‖ approach could evolve into more individualized 
efforts, although this may not be a realistic goal); Bryn Williams-Jones & Oonagh Patricia Corrigan, 
Rhetoric and Hype: Where‟s the „Ethics‟ in Pharmacogenomics?, 3 AM. J. PHARMACOGENOMICS 375, 
379 (2003). 
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III.  REGULATORY AND LEGAL ISSUES 
The utilization of pharmacogenomics in drug development has repercussions 
for diverse areas of the law. This section considers the FDA guidance on 
pharmacogenomic data submission as well as other FDA measures taken to ensure 
the safety and efficacy of pharmacogenomic advancements.140 The impact of the 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA) is explored in light of the creation of drug compounds for 
small targeted populations.141 This article concludes with a consideration of legal 
liability for both physicians and the pharmaceutical industry.142 
A.  The FDA 
Pharmacogenomics introduces new complexities to the already complicated 
system of drug development and approval, and it has been argued that 
pharmacogenomics will lead to a ―major, technology-driven restructuring‖ which 
would require ―bold leadership from relevant regulatory agencies worldwide.‖143 
The FDA encourages the incorporation of pharmacogenomics into the drug 
development process, and currently the agency has approved 114 drugs with 
pharmacogenomic information in their labels.144 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)145 authorizes the FDA to ensure 
that human and animal drugs, biological products, and therapeutic devices are safe 
and effective.146 The drug amendment to the FDCA of 1962 authorized the FDA to 
take a more preemptive approach to drug development, requiring premarket 
approval for every new drug.147 Thus, a new drug application (NDA) will only be 
approved once the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), which is 
responsible for approving NDAs, is convinced of the drug‘s safety and 
 
 140. See infra Part III.A. 
 141. See infra Part III.B. 
 142. See infra Part III.C. 
 143. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1290. 
 144. Table of Pharmacogenomic Biomarkers in Drug Labels, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm083378.htm (last 
updated Feb. 29, 2012). However, critics have noted that the current labeling process may be inadequate, 
as the information provided on the labels ―is probably of limited use to most physicians and patients‖ 
because it does not contain ―clear and comprehensive drug labeling that informs about genetic tests 
relevant to the safety or efficacy of use is critical to enhancing patient care.‖ Hudson, supra note 37, at 
1036. 
 145. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).  
 146. The FDA‘s mission is to ―protect public health . . . by helping to speed innovations that make 
medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable.‖ What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/default.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 147. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §101, 76 Stat. 780, 781. See also John J. 
Smith, Regulation of Medical Devices in Radiology: Current Standards and Future Opportunities, 218 
RADIOLOGY 329, 330 (2001) (explaining the premarket approval process).   
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effectiveness.148 In order to demonstrate safety and efficacy, drug companies spend 
millions of dollars and many years enrolling individuals in a series of clinical trials 
to generate the necessary data.149 The Office of Clinical Pharmacology in CDER is 
charged with reviewing biopharmaceutic, pharmacokinetic, and pharmacodynamic 
data in Investigational New Drug (IND) applications and NDAs.150 After the 
pioneer drug‘s patent has expired, FDA can approve abbreviated new drug 
applications (ANDAs), for which a generic drug sponsor may establish that the 
drug is a bioequivalent to the original product.151   
In general, the FDA has taken a wait and see approach to regulating new 
technologies. In the late 1990‘s, in response to developments in 
pharmacogenomics, the FDA indicated that it planned to maintain the ―drug 
approval process as it currently exists,‖ explaining that there is ―no problem with 
the promise of pharmacogenomics,‖ and that they were waiting for ―data to 
evaluate the results.‖152 As of 1998, the FDA still had no plans to focus any 
guidance solely on pharmacogenomics.153 Moreover, the FDA and other agencies 
thought it unlikely that pharmacogenomic information would be required for all 
drugs.154   
1.  Voluntary Genomic Data Submissions 
Only five years later, in November, 2003, the FDA released its draft guidance 
to industry regarding the submission of pharmacogenomic data to the agency.155 
 
 148. How Drugs are Developed and Approved, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/default.htm 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 149. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (explaining that the FDA mandates that 
manufacturers demonstrate their products meet efficacy and safety tests, and the entire process can range 
from 300 million to 600 million dollars).    
 150. Office of Clinical Pharmacology (OCP), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm10618
9.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2011). 
 151. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalap
plications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicationandagenerics/default.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2012). One 
author has maintained that pharmacogenomics will facilitate the way generic drugs are approved. Lars 
Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients‟ Genetic Profiles, 
43 JURIMETRICS 1, 18 (2002) (―Pharmacogenomic information could, therefore, provide a better basis 
for making comparative judgments about bioavailability and facilitate the approval and use of generic 
drugs in the future.‖). 
 152. Binzak, supra note 71, at 105. 
 153. See John Hodgson & Andrew Marshall, Pharmacogenomics: Will the Regulators Approve?, 16 
NATURE BIOTECH. 243, 243 (1998). 
 154. Id. at 243. 
 155. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY ON PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS (2003) [hereinafter FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE]. 
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Lawrence Lesko, the former Director of the Office of Clinical Pharmacology, 
stated that the agency has been atypically proactive in issuing its guidance.156 
Although industry often prefers a hands-off approach, the private sector 
sought guidance from the FDA regarding the use of pharmacogenomics in its 
R&D.157 Stephen Friend, a Senior Vice President at Merck, explained that both 
patients and pharmaceutical companies need ―ground rules because the correct use 
of this data . . . is going to be critical for it to be of benefit.‖158 In response, the 
FDA encouraged drug companies to conduct pharmacogenomic tests during drug 
development and to submit resulting data to the FDA, while maintaining an 
appropriate level of safety and efficacy for consumers.159 The draft guidance was 
considered quite ―pro-pharmacogenomics,‖ and the FDA stated that the nonbinding 
recommendations were intended to ―facilitate,‖ and ―not impede, the use of 
pharmacogenomic tests during drug development.‖160 In discussing the draft 
guidance, then-FDA Commissioner Mark B. McClellan explained that it was:  
[I]ntended to ensure that evolving regulatory policies and study 
designs are based on the best science; provide public confidence in 
this new field where scientifically appropriate; facilitate the use of 
such tests during drug development; and clarify for industry what 
types of pharmacogenomic data to submit to FDA.161   
The guidance sought to remedy pharmaceutical sponsors‘ hesitancy in using 
pharmacogenomic technologies in drug development by clarifying how the FDA 
will use and interpret in the drug application review process.162   
 
 156. Lawrence Lesko, Dir. of the Office of Clinical Pharmacology, Ctr. Drug Evaluation & Res., 
Luncheon Keynote Address at the Scientific American Present: Targeted Medicine: From Concept to 
Clinic (Nov. 11, 2004) (transcript available in the Fair Disclosure Wire) [hereinafter Lesko Keynote 
Address].   
 157. Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Will Issue Rules on New Era of „Personalized Medicine‟, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at B1 (―Major drug companies are likely to welcome a firm signal from the FDA 
that will reduce the questions surrounding the new field. They are also likely to applaud the agency‘s 
promise that voluntarily submitted information won‘t be used in decisions about drug approvals.‖). 
 158. Id.  
 159. See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 155 (―The draft guidance is intended to facilitate 
scientific progress in the area of pharmacogenomics, which should enable the FDA to use 
pharmacogenomic data in regulatory policies and decision making.‖); see also Hampton, supra note 50.  
 160. Letter from Joanna Waugh, Regulatory Grp. Dir., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., to the Dockets 
Mgmt. Branch (HFA-305) of the Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 2, 2004) (on file with the Journal of Health 
Care Law & Policy).  
 161. Frank S. Zollmann, FDA Issues Guidance on Pharmacogenomics Data, HUM-MOLGEN (Nov. 
5, 2003, 16:28), http://hum-molgen.org/NewsGen/11-2003/000015.html. The draft guidelines were 
intended to balance the thin line between: ―(a) accepting correlative data on genotype and drug response 
. . . and (b) ensuring that the first experiences evaluating this data will not act as a disincentive for drug 
companies embarking on existing and future drug research and development programs.‖ Shah, supra 
note 16, at 5. 
 162. Zollmann, supra note 161. 
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In March 2005, the FDA issued its final guidance, which did not vary 
significantly from the draft version.163 The fact that the final guidance had been so 
delayed led to some skepticism among those that it affects.164 In late 2004, Lesko 
denied that the wait for the final draft was due to a ―big, big problem,‖165 and 
attributed the delay to the 2004 political elections, which impeded the collaboration 
necessary to issue the final guidance.166 He also explained that the guidance had 
been postponed because it would be released with companion documents, including 
a ―roadmap for the voluntary submission process.‖167   
The guidance provides a number of examples of places in which the field of 
pharmacogenomics has yet to be established or generally accepted by the scientific 
community.168 The guidance is therefore intended to motivate the pharmaceutical 
industry to pursue pharmacogenomic R&D, allowing industry and the FDA to 
become comfortable with novel pharmacogenomic approaches as they develop and 
to establish consensus around pharmacogenomics standards and policies.169   
The FDA‘s guidance also provides a ―safe harbor,‖ which asks companies to 
voluntarily submit their pharmacogenomic data (―voluntary exploratory data 
submissions‖ or VXDSs), in return for the assurance that the agency will not make 
premature regulatory decisions based on these submissions.170 This assurance was a 
reaction to companies‘ concerns that data would be used against them to keep their 
products off the market or to ―limit [their] approval to a small subpopulation of 
 
 163. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Works to Speed the Advent of New, More Effective 
Personalized Medicine (Mar. 22, 2005). Although there is little obvious difference between the draft and 
final guidance, the final version did attempt to resolve ambiguities in the draft version. See FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP‘T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS—COMPANION GUIDANCE (2007) (clarifying voluntary 
genomic data submissions). In 2007, FDA released companion guidance to the 2005 guidance. Id. The 
addendum includes recommendations on gene expression data from microarrays, genotyping, genomic 
data in clinical study reports, genomic data from nonclinical toxicology studies, and data submission 
formats. Id. 
 164. See Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156; Mark Ratner, FDA Pharmacogenomics Guidance 
Sends Clear Message to Industry, 4 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 359, 359 (2005) (explaining that 
companies awaited the final guidance document for some time). 
 165. Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156.    
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. Others attributed the delay in part to Mark McClennan‘s departure from his position as 
Commissioner of FDA in March 2004. Malorye A. Branca, FDA Issues PGX Guidance, BIO-IT WORLD 
(Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.bio-itworld.com/BioIT_Article.aspx?id=39242. 
 168. See 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 3–4 (explaining the scientific uncertainty of 
pharmacogenomic test results which make regulatory decision-making difficult, such as probable or 
known valid biomarkers, as well as other less well-developed tests that are ―insufficient for making 
regulatory decisions‖).  
 169. See Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., supra note 163.  
 170. Federico M. Goodsaid et al., Voluntary Exploratory Data Submissions to the US FDA and the 
EMA: Experience and Impact, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 435, 435 (2010). VXDSs were 
formerly referred to as ―voluntary genomic data submissions‖ or VGDSs. Id. 
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patients.‖171 The FDA‘s policy is aimed at encouraging drug companies to share 
pharmacogenomic results without fear of the FDA demanding more research.172 
The agency plans to use submitted pharmacogenomic information to ―gain a better 
understanding of the field.‖173   
The Institutional Pharmacogenomics Review Group (IPRG) was created by 
the FDA to set a scientific and regulatory framework for reviewing VXDSs.174 If it 
is unclear whether a submission is voluntary or mandatory, the IPRG is responsible 
for convening a meeting with the sponsor and representative(s) from the relevant 
review division to help determine the status of the submission in question.175 The 
IPRG reviews voluntary data submissions and also, upon request, consults with 
FDA review staff regarding genomic data submissions that are required (per the 
relevant regulations) to be submitted to, or as part of, an existing application that 
will be used during the regulatory process.176   
The FDA guidance clarifies how submitted data will be utilized in regulatory 
decision-making, setting out three classifications of biomarkers: exploratory, 
probable valid, and known valid biomarkers.177 What differentiates the categories is 
―their validity or degree of validity,‖ or ―their degree of uncertainty.‖178 Lesko 
 
 171. Hampton, supra note 50, at 32. The FDA lists the following as advantages of voluntarily 
submitting pharmacogenomic data, including the opportunities for industry to: (1) have informal 
meeting with FDA pharmacogenomics experts; (2) ―[r]eceive and benefit from informal peer-review 
feedback‖ on pharmacogenomics issues and/or questions; (3) ―[g]ain insight into current FDA thinking‖ 
about pharmacogenomics that may assist in reach strategic decisions; and (4) familiarize FDA with 
pharmacogenomics experiments, data analysis and interpretation approaches. Genomics: Frequently 
Asked Questions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm083893.htm (last 
visited April 13, 2012). 
 172. See Mathews, supra note 157 (noting that the FDA may ask ―companies to voluntarily submit 
more general research in pharmacogenomics‖); see also Richard Fisler, Biomarkers in Clinical 
Development: Implications for Personalized Medicine and Streamlining R&D, ADVANCES LIFE 
SCIENCES REPORT 16 (2005) (explaining that many companies fear a delay in approval of their product 
due to FDA questioning). 
 173. Such knowledge is ―important, because there‘s a lot of uncertainty about the significance of 
data in these areas,‖ according to the director of regulatory affairs of a large pharmaceutical company. 
Mathews, supra note 157. 
 174. Interdisciplinary Pharmacogenomics Review Group (IPRG), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm083889.htm (last 
updated July 27, 2010). 
 175. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANUAL OF POLICIES 
AND PROCEDURES: MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERDISCIPLINARY PHARMACOGENOMICS REVIEW GROUP 
(IPRG) 1–3 (2005) [hereinafter MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES]. 
 176. Id. at 2–3. 
 177. 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 4 (explaining ―when the data will be considered 
sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for regulatory decision making; when it will be considered only 
supportive to a decision; and when the data will not be used in regulatory decision making.‖). 
 178. Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156. See 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 4 
(distinguishing between known valid biomarkers, which are accepted in the broad scientific community, 
Koch.JHCLP.15.2.publisher  
286 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 15:263 
explained that ―the function is driven by the classification, and then the function in 
turn drives the submission process, whether it is voluntary or required and whether 
it is a full report, abbreviated or synopsis.‖179 The guidance informs drug sponsors 
on when and how to submit pharmacogenomic data ―during the drug or biological 
drug product development and review processes,‖ what format and content must be 
submitted, and how the data will, or will not, be used in regulatory decision 
making.180 Moreover, although the submission of pharmacogenomic data is 
generally voluntary, the FDA guidance recommends that tests and drugs be co-
developed, and all information submitted to the agency;181 this way a drug sponsor 
can ―fully integrate pharmacogenomic data into the drug development program.‖182 
Thus, in issuing its pharmacogenomics-related guidance, the FDA sought to 
remain consistent with existing agency policy.183 Mandatory genomic data 
submissions continue to be processed according to standard processing for routine 
application submissions.184 Moreover, the FDA provides detailed instructions for 
determining when a drug company is required to submit pharmacogenomic data for 
an IND.185 For example, if data is submitted to a known valid biomarker, the 
information must be submitted pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 312.23.186 The FDA 
guidance provides a unique submission algorithm for each category because FDA 
regulations enunciate different requirements for INDs, unapproved NDAs and 
Biologics License Applications (BLAs), and approved NDAs and BLAs.187  
 
and probable valid biomarkers, which appear to have predictive value but may not yet be widely 
accepted). 
 179. Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156. 
 180. 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 1. 
 181. Id. at 6. 
 182. Id.; see Hampton, supra note 50, at 33 (explaining that collaboration between the FDA and the 
pharmaceutical industry is important from a clinical perspective).  
 183. 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 3.  
 184. MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 175, at 2. 
 185. 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 19–20. A company must submit a full report if:  
1. The test results are used for making decisions pertaining to a specific clinical trial, or 
in an animal trial used to support safety (e.g., the results will affect dose selection, entry 
criteria into a clinical trial safety monitoring, or subject stratification).   
2. A sponsor is using the test results to support scientific arguments pertaining to, for 
example, the pharmacologic mechanism of action, the selection of drug dosing or the 
safety and effectiveness of a drug.   
3. The test results constitute a known, valid biomarker for physiologic, pathophysiologic, 
pharmacologic, toxicologic, or clinical states or outcomes in humans, or is a known valid 
biomarker for a safety outcome in animal studies or a probable valid biomarker in human 
safety studies.  If the information on the biomarker (example, human CYP2D6 status) is 
not being used for purposes 1 or 2 above, the information can be submitted to the IND as 
an abbreviated report. 
Id. 
 186. Id. at 24. 
 187. Id. at 8–12 (explaining the algorithms in Section IV of the report). 
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Lesko predicted that the relation between submission format and which 
definition will apply to biomarkers within the ―hierarchy‖ the guidance provides 
would be one of the most contentious issues with the guidance.188 Many claimed 
that the definitions in the guidance were unclear, and ―you need[ed] a lot of specific 
examples to walk through them, either with a sponsor or with a review division at 
FDA.‖189 Most likely in response, the FDA published Quick Reference materials, 
which contain a series of decision trees to make the process as clear as possible.190 
The guide provides a simple table for determining when data is required to be 
submitted and when it may be submitted voluntarily.191 To clarify further, the FDA 
also issued an attachment to the guidance, providing prototypical examples of 
voluntary and required submissions.192 
Reactions to the guidance have been generally positive.193 In the first five 
years after its release, the agency received more than 40 VXDSs, resulting in more 
than 35 meetings between the FDA and industry sponsors.194 However, FDA 
representatives assert that ―[i]ndustry sponsors have not fully embraced the 
[VXDS] concept as evidenced by the fact that numerous major pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies have never submitted a [VXDS] to the FDA.‖195 
2.  Other FDA Approaches  
Pharmacogenomics has impacted the way entities that determine licensing 
and prescription of new drugs interact with entities that regulate and approve linked 
 
 188. Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 19–24. 
 191. Id. at 24. 
 192. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ATTACHMENT TO 
GUIDANCE ON PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS: EXAMPLES OF VOLUNTARY SUBMISSIONS OR 
SUBMISSIONS REQUIRED UNDER 21 CFR 312, 314, OR 601 (2005). However, some issues were not 
clarified–for example, how pharmacogenomics may affect how drugs will be classified as orphan drugs 
under the Orphan Drug Act of 1983. NAT‘L INST. HEALTH, NIH COMMENTS ON FDA‘S DRAFT 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSION 2 (2004).  
 193. Goodsaid et al., supra note 170, at 435 (VXDSs have ―a positive impact on the content of 
biomarker data in subsequent regulatory applications‖ and ―industry is successfully integrating novel 
biomarker data in drug development.‖). 
 194. Id. at 435. Goodsaid et al. note:  
VXDS meetings have led to mutually beneficial and effective interactions between the 
FDA, the [European Medicines Agency], and sponsors of VXDSs (pharmaceutical 
companies, technology providers and academic researchers). Because of the importance of 
biomarker strategies and pharmacogenetics in drug development, as enumerated by the 
FDA‘s Critical Path Initiative, the VXDS process is likely to adapt to meet the changing 
and growing needs of both the regulatory agencies and VXDS sponsors. 
Id. at 444. 
 195. Lesko & Zineh, supra note 21, at 508 (explaining this reluctance may be based on ―residual 
apprehension about the FDA review of voluntary genomic data, confusion over the requirements of a 
voluntary submission versus a required submission or the perception that it is not worth the time or 
effort to prepare and submit a [VXDS]‖). 
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tests and other medical devices.196 For example, the FDA established the Office of 
Combination Products to ―streamline the processing of complex drug-device, drug-
biologic, and device-biologic combination products that play an increasingly 
significant role in health care.‖197 Moreover, as part of the Critical Path Initiative, 
an effort to ―stimulate and facilitate the modernization of the sciences through 
which regulated products are developed, evaluated, and manufactured,‖ the FDA 
has attempted to clarify co-development of pharmacogenomic-based therapeutic 
drugs and associated diagnostic tests.198 In April 2005, the FDA released its draft 
Drug-Diagnostic Co-Development Concept Paper, which directly addresses drugs 
that require a genetic test before the drug is administered.199 It provides guidance 
regarding whether the therapy and diagnostic are required to be co-developed, 
approved together, or considered a combination product.200   
There are a number of additional ways in which the FDA could address the 
various implications of pharmacogenomics. The FDA‘s 2005 guidance indicates 
that the agency is committed to educating the pharmaceutical industry about how 
pharmacogenomic data can be submitted to help a  drug through the approval 
process.201 The FDA has set up a number of workshops focusing on the integration 
of genomics and diagnostics into the drug development process.202 Moreover, 
because the agency is concerned that FDA officials may not be prepared to deal 
with the number of INDs and NDAs containing genomic information that may be 
submitted, the FDA has sponsored a number of internal educational programs.203 
 
 196. Shah, supra note 16, at 7. 
 197. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Establishes Office of Combination Products (Dec. 
31, 2002).  
 198. Pharmacogenomics and its Role in Drug Safety, 1 FDA DRUG SAFETY NEWSLETTER (Food & 
Drug Admin., Silver Spring, MD), Winter 2008, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ 
DrugSafetyNewsletter/ucm119991.htm. 
 199. Food & Drug Admin., Drug-Diagnostic Co-Development Concept Paper 1 (Apr. 2005) 
(unpublished draft), www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/ 
Pharmacogenetics/UCM116689.pdf. 
 200. Id. at 1–5.  
 201. See 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 2–3, 14–16 (noting that with the guidance the FDA 
hopes to ―clarify‖ its policy in terms of how pharmacogenomic testing will be used in the drug 
application review process). 
 202. See id. at 3 (indicating that in May 2002, the Agency and pharmaceutical industry groups held 
workshops to discuss the important issues surrounding ―the application of pharmacogenetics and 
pharmacogenomics to drug development‖).  
 203. See Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156. In his keynote address, Lesko indicated that: 
[The FDA has sponsored] a number of educational programs for people in the center to 
raise their awareness level and better prepare them for the applications they‘re going to 
see. And they are going to see them because already we can see a significant increase in 
the number of INDs and NDAs coming in that contain genomic information, and we have 
to get a readiness in the staff. 
Id.  
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The FDA also has hosted a lecture series designed for scientists and created a new 
training program on genomics for review staff.204   
Instituting more safeguards throughout the FDA approval process—for 
example, by requiring genetics experts on IRBs—may ensure that the increasing 
use of pharmacogenomics is encouraged while ensuring appropriate research 
participant protections.205 Another option is to build in-house regulatory expertise 
to monitor evolving regulations and to help the FDA determine how the regulatory 
process should apply to pharmacogenomics.206 
a.  Increased Phase IV Monitoring 
In order to further regulate pharmacogenomics, the FDA may also require 
increased monitoring during phase IV trials, which take place after the drug or 
treatment has been licensed and marketed.207 The use of pharmacogenomics in 
premarketing studies may call for a greater focus on postmarketing surveillance.208 
Since the premarket trial population will likely be small relative to current clinical 
studies, potential ADRs may not be identified as readily.209 Thus, continued post-
marketing monitoring would allow a larger trial population than in the 
premarketing clinical trials, although use of the drug after FDA approval is not as 
controlled as during the approval process.210   
 
 204. Presentations on Genomics: FDA Genomics Group Presentations in 2010-2011, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm085427.htm 
(last updated Sept. 27, 2011). 
 205. Binzak, supra note 72, at 115–16.  
 206. See SEC‘Y‘S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC‘Y, U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF PHARMACOGENOMICS: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES 78 (2008) (explaining that because limited awareness about the impacts of 
pharmacogenetics by health care decision-makers could harm the advancement of the technologies, 
regulating bodies like the FDA must have adequate in-house expertise in pharmacogenetics). 
 207. Phase IV clinical trials are conducted in order to glean additional information regarding the 
drug‘s risks, benefits, and optimal use. See 21 U.S.C. § 356a(b) (2006) (providing authority for 
monitoring the progress of post-marketing studies that drug and biologic applicants have agreed to 
conduct). 
 208. Noah, supra note 151, at 24 (―Because of the inherent limitations of clinical trials, 
pharmacogenomic interventions will not alter the existing need for postmarket surveillance . . . .‖). One 
author recommends a more formal (and therefore more costly) phase IV system because of the smaller 
premarketing trials that will be a result of pharmacogenomics. Shah, supra note 16, at 7.  
 209. See Binzak, supra note 71, at 125–26 (noting the difficulty in detecting adverse drug responses 
in a phase III trial, in which only several thousand people may be included). 
 210. Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/ucm090385.htm 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting that postmarketing surveillance is critical because all of a drug‘s 
possible side effects cannot be determined based on preapproval studies that involve a maximum of 
several thousand patients and sometimes only several hundred). See also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 
POSTMARKETING SURVEILLANCE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 18 (1982) (noting that while clinical trials 
are conducted under strict rules, effects of a drug administered by a regular physician or outpatient clinic 
is not as controlled and cannot be fully assessed).   
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As phase IV trials become more indispensable for ensuring safety and 
efficacy, the Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment, which is responsible 
for conducting epidemiological studies involving possible adverse outcomes, might 
be in the best position to regulate postmarketing surveillance.211 Critics argue that 
the FDA must be more ―proactive‖ in ―considering how it is going to regulate the 
new pharmacogenomic drugs already being developed.‖212 However, increased 
focus on phase IV trials may stretch the FDA‘s scarce resources even further.213 In 
2002, the FDA reported that, of its 2400 postmarketing NDA commitments, only 
882 had been completed.214   
Alternatively, the FDA may consider requiring drug developers that, in 
postmarketing surveillance, find that the number of ADRs is above a certain 
threshold set by FDA to perform pharmacogenomic studies of the drug or submit to 
withdrawal from the market.215 One critic claims that this could benefit drug 
manufacturers as well, because: 
ADR studies could serve as an additional revenue stream in which the 
manufacturer could secure intellectual property rights in any 
pharmacogenetics test derived from its ADR studies and may avoid a 
complete withdrawal of its drug from the market by labeling changes 
that would permit the screening out of patients at risk from the drug.216 
However, one concern with shifting the focus to greater surveillance after 
FDA approval is that it might be dangerous to leave adverse event surveillance and 
reporting until a drug is already on the market. Doing so might potentially defeat 
the FDA mandate to ensure safety and efficacy by allowing the product onto the 





 211. Mark A. Rothstein, Epilogue: Policy Prescriptions, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, 
ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 319, 324 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2003). FDA has authority to 
withdraw a drug from the market due to postmarketing study results. Id. at 325. 
 212. Binzak, supra note 71, at 107. 
 213. Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration‟s Use of Postmarketing (Phase IV) 
Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 380 (2006) (noting that the 
resources of the agency ―are limited . . . particularly in the case of postapproval activities‖). 
 214. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: REPORTS ON POSTMARKETING STUDIES 10 
(2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-drugs-
gen/documents/document/ucm071529.pdf. 
 215. Wu, supra note 34, at 745–46. 
 216. Id. at 746. 
 217. See Rena Steinzor & Margaret Clune, The Hidden Lesson of the Vioxx Fiasco: Reviving a 
Hollow FDA, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM WHITE PAPER NO. 514, Oct. 2005, at 11, 1718 
(highlighting the importance of pre-market drug safety reviews and how speeding up drug approvals can 
increase post-marketing risks). 
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b.  Off-Label Use 
An issue of major concern to the FDA is the problem of off-label 
prescription.218 Drugs are only FDA-approved for use in the permitted population, 
and drug companies are prohibited from encouraging off-label use.219 However, 
physicians are not subject to the FDA prohibition, because the agency does not 
regulate the practice of medicine.220 Thus, physicians are allowed to prescribe 
drugs for off-label use,221 which arguably ensures ―clinical freedom‖ and fosters 
innovation, leading to the development of new treatments.222 The use of smaller, 
more targeted trial samples in clinical studies may have enormous implications 
once the drug is on the market, because the number of individuals for whom use of 
the drug would be off-label would potentially increase as the approved population 
shrinks.223 Further, because off-label use might be more dangerous for compounds 
developed via pharmacogenomics research than for other one-size-fits-all 
blockbuster drugs due to the risk of adverse drug reactions, it might be necessary to 
require more safeguards for off-label usage in the future. 
Potential solutions to the augmented problem of off-label use exist and could 
be implemented alone or jointly. One option would require study groups to 
encompass more varied genotypes.224 This would extend required clinical studies 
on special populations prior to a drug‘s approval, because small premarket targeted 
studies will mean that those with dissimilar genomes will not otherwise have been 
tested for adverse events.225 However, increasing the size of trial populations might 
directly counteract the benefit that pharmacogenomics presents for clinical trials, 
 
 218. The FDA has released multiple guidance documents on the topic. See, e.g., “Off-Label” and 
Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics and Medical Devices – Information Sheet, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm (last updated 
Aug. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Information Sheet]; Office of the Comm‘r, Food & Drug Admin, Guidance 
for Industry: Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or 
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or 
Cleared Medical Devices (Jan. 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm [hereinafter Good Reprint 
Practices]; see also Off-label but Not Unregulated, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at A14 (discussing the 
government‘s approach to off-label uses). 
 219. Good Reprint Practices, supra note 218.   
 220. Information Sheet, supra note 218.   
 221. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 345, 369 (2007). 
 222. MELZER ET AL., supra note 49, at 51. 
 223. Id. at 12; see also Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the Role of 
the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427–28 (2008) (noting that there has been no formal evaluation 
of off-label uses of drugs and evidence for a clinical situation might not apply to other situations). 
 224. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 41 (recommending that a larger safety file than just the 
genotypic subgroup be required). 
 225. Id. 
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thereby negating the efficiency and safety advantages offered by the field.226 Some 
critics have also recommended that DNA samples be collected as part of adverse 
event reporting.227 This information could then be made available to the academic 
community for further research and analysis, to gauge if the compound is safe for 
use in the broader population. Alternatively, the FDA could offer a new class of 
conditional approvals for drugs targeted to particular subpopulations.228 
Moreover, physician education might be necessary regarding the dangerous 
consequences of off-label prescription for genetically-targeted drugs, while 
maintaining the legality of off-label prescribing.229 A final option, which will be 
discussed in more depth in section III.C, is to impose stricter liability on physicians 
who prescribe pharmacogenomics products off-label, resulting in harm to the 
patient.230  
B.  The Orphan Drug Act 
The often-cited ―orphan drug problem‖ refers to industry‘s reluctance, in light 
of financial limitations, to develop drugs for diseases that affect small segments of 
the patient population.231 Pharmacogenomics intensifies this problem because it 
divides patient populations into smaller subpopulations, thereby disincentivizing 
the development of new drugs for these discrete groups.232 Thus, economic 
―incentives for research may be weakest precisely where improved targeting is 
most needed.‖233 
In 1983, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) to provide incentives 
for developing drugs for small markets.234 The ODA focuses on the 25 to 30 
 
 226. Id. at 46 (noting that pharmacogenomics will allow the more efficient and quicker development 
of compounds because of smaller trial samples and more predictable outcomes). 
 227. Id. at 53. 
 228. Id. at 41 (―[A] more flexible approach offering ‗conditional‘ approvals could be appropriate 
here.‖). 
 229. The education of physicians will be discussed in more detail in the section on physician 
liability. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 230. See infra note 296 and accompanying text. 
 231. Richard Y. Cheung et al., Orphan Drug Policies: Implications for the United States, Canada, 
and Developing Countries, 12 HEALTH L.J. 183, 184 (2004) (identifying the increased cost of drug 
development as the reason for the pharmaceutical industry‘s focus on drugs addressing common 
diseases). The problem has also been described as ―the possibility of focusing on ‗easier to treat‘ subsets 
of the population and excluding from trials those with unfavourable, or simply unusual, genetic 
constitutions.‖ Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 945. 
 232. Buckley & McKinnon, supra note 69, at 23. See also Thomas Morrow, Orphan Drug Act 
Treatments Deserve Full Insurance Coverage, MANAGED CARE MAG. (Sept. 2004), 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0409/0409.biotech.html (exclaiming that, because of this 
stratification ―[w]e may all soon be orphans‖). 
 233. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1289.   
 234. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa, 360bb, 360cc, 360dd (2006) (codifying the Orphan Drug Act); 21 
C.F.R. § 316 (2011); see also Morrow, supra note 232 (crediting the Orphan Drug Act with 
incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to research and develop drugs for small populations); Enrique 
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million Americans with one of almost 7,000 rare—or ―orphan‖—diseases.235 
Currently, orphan drug status applies to drugs that are effective for fewer than 
200,000 patients or those that affect a greater number, but for which ―there is no 
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the 
United States a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in 
the United States of such drug.‖236 Patient population is determined by the total 
number of individuals with clinical symptoms, rather than those who would 
actually be eligible for use of the drug.237 This definition has great implications for 
products developed using pharmacogenomics.  
Specifically, the ODA: (1) grants the sponsoring organization seven years of 
marketing exclusivity, beginning on the date of FDA approval for the designated 
orphan indication;238 (2) gives a 50 percent tax credit toward the financing of 
clinical trials in humans;239 and (3) provides grants up to 150,000 dollars for phase 
I studies and up to 300,000 dollars for Phase II and III studies.240 Through 
exclusivity incentives, drug developers may recover the costs of investing in 
expensive orphan genotypes.241 The FDA often grants priority review for orphan 
drugs, and therapies may also be considered for a rapid approval under the special 
accelerated process.242   
 
Seoane-Vazquez et al., Incentives for Orphan Drug Research and Development in the United States, 3 
ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES 33, 33 (2008) (stating that the Orphan Drug Act was enacted to facilitate 
development and marketing of orphan drugs). In October 2011, HHS proposed modifications to the 
ODA regulations. See Orphan Drug Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 64868 (proposed Oct. 19, 2011) 
(proposing changes to the Orphan Drug Act like specific subsets of orphan designations). 
 235. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFG. AM., 2011 REPORT: ORPHAN DRUGS IN DEVELOPMENT FOR RARE 
DISEASES 1 (2011).  
 236. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2006).  
 237. Buckley & McKinnon, supra note 69, at 23. 
 238. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2006). See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP‘T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 1 (2001) [hereinafter THE 
ORPHAN DRUG ACT]. This contrasts with the five years granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. 
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development 
Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189 (1999). 
 239. 26 U.S.C. § 45C(a) (2006). See also THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT, supra note 238, at 1. 
 240. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (2006). See also THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT, supra note 238, at 1; Morrow, 
supra note 240,  
 241. Wu, supra note 34, at 745 (―Exclusivity may include barring other drug developers from 
submitting competing drug applications. Moreover, exclusivity may include extending prescription drug 
benefits to cover drugs for orphan genotypes while denying or limiting coverage for competing drugs.‖). 
See also Paul V. Buday, Hints on Preparing Successful Orphan Drug Designation Requests, 51 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 75, 7677 (1996) (detailing the incentives for developing orphan drugs). 
 242. Buday, supra note 241, at 76 & n.11 (discussing approval times for orphan drugs). In 1997, 
Congress waived the usual drug application fee charged by the FDA for orphan drugs, amounting to 
approximately 500,000 dollar savings to drug developers. Morrow, supra note 232.  
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The ODA, sometimes called one of most successful laws Congress has ever 
written,243 enabled FDA not only to oversee drug development, but to take an 
active role.244 The Act is responsible for the largest single source of clinical grants 
from the FDA: in 2010, FDA awarded approximately 14 million dollars in grants 
for orphan drugs, funding 22 new grants and approximately 40 other ongoing 
clinical study projects.245 Since the passage of the ODA, 350 drugs for orphan 
diseases have received FDA approval.246 In contrast, in the decade before the 
ODA‘s passage, less than ten drugs and biological products for rare diseases were 
brought to market.247 Further, ―orphan drug product designations more than 
doubled‖ in the first decade of the twenty-first century.248 Notably, approximately 
50 percent of the biologics approved for marketing in the U.S. since 1982 have 
been designated orphan drugs.249   
Not all pharmacogenomic products will attain orphan drug status under the 
ODA. Although it is ―anticipated by industry that subgroups of patients, defined by 
genotype would qualify,‖ orphan status may not be certain, ―particularly where the 
target population is only a subgroup of the disease indication.‖250 A drug‘s patient 
population is generally defined according to the total expected treatment 
population, not just those whom the pharmaceutical company identifies as eligible 
for clinical trials.251 Thus, Herceptin, which is often cited as a rational model for 
pharmacogenomics, was refused orphan status by the FDA for metastatic breast 
cancer because the agency disagreed with the drug sponsor‘s interpretation of the 
size of the target population.252 The Office of Orphan Products Development 
 
 243. Marlene E. Haffner et al., Two Decades of Orphan Product Development, 1 NATURE REVS. 
DRUG DISCOVERY 821, 821 (2002). 
 244. Morrow, supra note 232. 
 245. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST 120, 122 (2010). 
 246. Office of Orphan Prod. Dev., Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/orphan/designat/allap.rtf (last updated March 20, 2012). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., U.S. Orphan Product Designations More Than Doubled 
from 2000-02 to 2006-08, 12 IMPACT REP., no. 1, 2010 at 1. 
 249. Morrow, supra note 232. However, managed care organizations have been hesitant to cover 
drugs approved via the orphan drug process, suggesting that the drugs are ―less ‗proven‘ than those 
developed through traditional pathways.‖ Id. One reason they cite is that double blind randomized 
controlled studies are often not possible because of the dearth of patients. Id. One alternative to such 
studies is historic-control trials. Morrow cites the approval of an enzyme which demonstrated efficacy in 
treating severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID) as a prime example of a historic-control study, 
which only had six patients enrolled in its pivotal trial. Id. 
 250. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 41. 
 251. Mignon Fogarty, Up for Adoption: Pharmacogenetics and the Orphan Drug Law (Dec. 11, 
1998), http://acor.org/sgreene/hmsbeagle/html/content/44/people/op_ed.htm.  
 252. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 52 (indicating that the FDA considered 
Herceptin‘s limited patient population of approximately 165,000 U.S. women with metastatic breast 
cancer as insufficient and opining that the FDA tries to restrict those drugs that obtain orphan 
designation to prevent pharmaceutical companies from dividing the market for economic benefit). 
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(OOPD) defended its decision not to grant the drug orphan drug status and 
explained that pharmacogenomic products would not be treated differently than 
other orphan drug submissions.253   
However, many support the expansion of the ODA to apply to subpopulations 
identified via pharmacogenomic discoveries.254 To rectify the possibility that 
stratification of patients by their genetic makeup will lead to a dearth of treatments 
for those groups, the British Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommends that 
regulatory agencies prepare guidance that ―use existing orphan medicine 
legislation, or any other policy instrument with equivalent effect, to provide 
incentives for development.‖255 It has been suggested that Congress be encouraged 
to consider making the ODA more flexible and extending resources to the FDA to 
support the development of drugs for orphan genotypes.256 
Application of the ODA, although incentivizing pharmacogenomic research 
by drug companies, gives rise to distributive justice questions related to the 
allocation of scarce research resources between different orphan disease groups.257 
One critic recommends supplementing ―moral theory with transparent, well-
reasoned political debate‖ and advocates cost-benefit analysis in order to give 
preferential treatment to those drugs that are considered cost-beneficial.258   
C.  Legal Liability 
As pharmacogenomic discoveries enter the market, higher diagnostic and 
prescription precision will likely lead to better matching between patients and the 
appropriate drugs, a reduction or elimination of adverse effects, and more targeted 
dosaging according to one‘s individual metabolism.259 However, because of these 
advances, adverse events or ineffective treatments will be scrutinized. Who will 
bear the liability for side effects or unsuccessful therapies? Increased liability may 
encourage more diligence on both physicians and pharmaceutical manufacturers‘ 
 
 253. Jai Shah, Economic and Regulatory Considerations in Pharmacogenomics for Drug Licensing 
and Healthcare, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 747, 749 (2003). Note that regardless of orphan drug status, 
Herceptin has become profitable. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PHARMACOGENETICS: ETHICAL 
ISSUES CONSULTATION PAPER 10 (2003). However, it is not clear that this will be true for other drugs 
with smaller patient populations. Id. 
 254. See Greely, supra note 22, at 8.   
 255. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xix. 
 256. Rothstein, supra note 211, at 324 (encouraging increased funding for translational research to 
facilitate further innovation). 
 257. Arti K. Rai, Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan Drugs, and Distributive Justice: The Role 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 19 J. SOCIAL PHIL. & POL‘Y, July 2002, at 246, 248.  
 258. See id. at 270. 
 259. See Teresa Kelton, Pharmacogenomics: The Re-Discovery of the Concept of Tailored Drug 
Therapy and Personalized Medicine, 19 HEALTH LAWYER, Jan. 2007, at 1, 3 (describing the benefits of 
pharmacogenomic-based diagnostics). 
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parts. Often, the choice of defendant depends on who has the deeper pockets.260 
Additionally, in the pharmacogenomic context, the choice of defendant may depend 
on whether advertising is direct-to-consumer or whether there is a third party 
intermediary. 
There is currently little liability attached to mistakes related to drug 
prescription due to the presumption in law and ethics that medicine is ―inherently 
imprecise‖ compared to other types of science.261 This presumption may have a 
deterrent effect on drug companies from developing targeted, more precise 
pharmacogenomic products. Because the law‘s ―special rules‖ regarding medicine 
may be based on outdated presumptions, they may necessitate evolution and 
modification.262 
One hindrance to holding a physician or drug company liable for deleterious 
drug effects or lack of efficacious treatment is the problem of demonstrating 
causation.263 Causation of an adverse event by a particular drug may be difficult to 
prove because of the complexities of environmental interactions, coupled with 
other possible causative factors. Moreover, defendants may use genetic discoveries 
to establish alternative causes for the adverse events for which they are being held 
responsible, using genetic information to demonstrate that the individual would 
have developed the illness regardless of the drug‘s effect.264 The defendants could 
use an individual‘s genetic susceptibility to an illness to demonstrate that they have 
no duty to protect ―hypersensitive individuals.‖265   
 
 260. See Steven S. Gensler, Prejudice, Confusion, and the Bifurcated Civil Jury Trial: Lessons From 
Tennessee, 67 TENN. L. REV. 653, 661–62 (2000) (pointing out that courts often instill procedural 
safeguards to prevent net worth evidence from becoming a factor).  
 261. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1289 (comparing the implied warranties of appliances to the 
vague and imprecise nature of medicine). One of the authors‘ recommendations to incentivize 
pharmacogenomic research include reversing state statutes and court doctrines ―that have long shielded 
medical product manufacturers from refund obligations.‖ Id. at 1290. 
 262. Id. 
 263. ―The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty through conduct that fails to meet the applicable standard of care, (3) 
harm or injury, and (4) a causal link between the injury and the breach of duty.‖ Sharona Hoffman, 
Responders‟ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 
1926 (2008). 
 264. See Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances: Part II – Genetic Susceptibility to 
Environmental Agents, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10641, 10648 (2003). For example, a ―defendant could also 
argue that the plaintiff‘s disease resulted solely from his or her genetic predisposition, which caused the 
disease to develop independent of any exposure to the defendant‘s product.‖ Id. Genetic test could 
demonstrate that a person‘s predisposition decreased susceptibility to a disease, thereby providing a 
useful defense against causation. A defendant could also ―seek to test the plaintiff for other genetic 
variants that provide increased resilience to the toxic agent at issue, which would make that person less 
susceptible than the average person.‖ Id. 
 265. Id. Marchant provides: 
In particular, defendants could assert what has sometimes been described as the 
―idiosyncratic response‖ defense. This defense protects from liability a defendant whose 
product or activity is harmless to the general public but may injure a small number of 
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Further, because of the complexity of genetic information, and the ―perils 
inherent in broad statistical judgments based on science that will be inexact even in 
the best scenario,‖ it will often be impossible to demonstrate a simple cause and 
effect relationship between one‘s genetic profile and the disease or side effects one 
exhibits.266 It is clear that not all tests are completely accurate, and the more 
complicated the gene interactions, the less accurate any prescription might be.   
1.  Individual Liability  
Pharmacogenomics could be a double-edged sword, where physicians are 
penalized for either prescribing or withholding pharmacogenomically-developed 
drugs and treatments.267 It is unclear whether physicians will have an obligation to 
utilize pharmacogenomic diagnostics to hone an individual‘s prescription to his or 
her genetic profile, or whether doctors can continue to follow the status quo in 
diagnosing and prescribing medicines.268 For example, a patient could sue his or 
her doctor for adverse events associated with a prescription given according to 
currently accepted standards, which may not have kept pace with scientific 
innovations. Will there be liability for not testing for genetic predispositions or 
using a particular treatment?   
A patient could ostensibly sue a physician for medical malpractice claiming 
that he or she refused to prescribe a drug (perhaps off-label) because it was not 
approved for his or her exact genetic makeup (i.e., he or she did not have the 
genetic predisposition of those involved in the clinical studies).269 Under the current 
liability regime, physicians may be sued for malpractice for negligent prescription 
of drugs, and courts have found doctors liable for failing to test for and prescribe 
the most appropriate drug for a particular individual.270 Pharmacogenomic 
discoveries may therefore render adverse effects more predictable than for other 
 
individuals with a unique and unusual susceptibility. This defense has generally been 
applied in cases where a plaintiff developed a rare allergenic response to a cosmetic or 
similar product, but the defense would presumably also apply to cases where a plaintiff 
was harmed due to a rare genetic susceptibility to a product that is otherwise harmless to 
the general population. 
Id. Marchant continues, ―[t]he formal justification for this defense is that the hyper-susceptibility of the 
plaintiff, rather than some defect in the product, is the proximate cause of the plaintiff‘s injury.‖ Id. 
 266. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1290. 
 267. See Mark A. Rothstein, Liability Issues in Pharmacogenomics, 66 LA. L. REV. 117, 121–22, 
124 (2005) (detailing the need to provide the best care to patients while protecting themselves from 
liability in the new venture of pharmacogenomics). 
 268. See id. at 122 (indicating the possibility of potential liability in the future for failure to utilize 
newer, more individualized medication). 
 269. See Rothstein, supra note 267, at 122.  
 270. See Noah, supra note 151, at 24 & n.12. 
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drugs,271 and physicians may consequently be subject to stricter medical liability 
for off-label prescription of pharmacogenomics products.272   
Because of the probabilistic nature of genetics, it is unclear how high a 
possibility of a drug not working or having deleterious effects would be necessary 
to justify denial of treatment.273 If there is only a single available treatment, the 
threshold for refusing it may be higher than if there are multiple treatments from 
which to choose.274 Some critics recommend greater liability for negative outcomes 
or ineffective treatment results, worrying that there is the possibility that ―[p]eople 
receiving a ‗negative‘ test result will be denied a (more remote) chance of the drug 
working for them. Where there are no alternatives this may cause conflict.‖275 They 
have called for new ―standards to limit lawsuits against providers who deny 
treatments based on careful, evidence-based inferences that the therapy, if 
administered, would not work.‖276 
2.  Liability Against Pharmaceutical Companies  
Pharmaceutical companies may also face liability for faulty products or for 
failure to warn consumers directly of the possible ADRs associated with their 
products.277 Once a patient is warned of the possibility of ADRs related to one‘s 
genetic predisposition, however, it could be argued that the patient has assumed the 
risk and may therefore not recover if he or she experiences an adverse reaction.278 
To support a product liability claim, a plaintiff could also allege that the 
failure to use pharmacogenomic technologies resulted in a marketing or design 
defect.279 Because of the state of the technology, however, the required expert 
 
 271. See Giovanni Severino & Maria Del Zompo, Adverse Drug Reactions: Role of 
Pharmacogenomics, 49 PHARMACOLOGICAL RES. 363, 367, 370–71 (2004) (explaining that 
pharmacogenomics provides a ―plausible basis‖ for predictive testing as well as enhanced understanding 
of potentially fatal adverse drug reactions).  
 272. See Tilo Mandry, Legal Implications of Pharmacogenomics Regarding Drug Trials, Drug 
Labeling, and Genetic Testing for Drug Prescription: An International Approach, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
519, 528–29 (2004) (noting that physicians may face liability for prescribing off-label ―genotypically-
defined drug[s]‖ when genetic testing could have shown the drugs to be harmful or ineffective). 
 273. See Greely, supra note 22, at 2 (discussing the potential levels of beneficence that will be 
required by regulatory bodies such as the FDA for approval of drugs that are effective for an identifiable 
and lesser part of the population or, alternatively, may only harm a particular and trivial part of the 
population while providing benefits to others). 
 274. See Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1290 (elaborating that although a group may not respond 
collectively when results are averaged, individuals within that group still have potential for response, 
and as a result, such individuals may be harmed if denied treatment, particularly when there are no other 
treatment options). 
 275. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 49. 
 276. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1290. 
 277. See Rothstein, supra note 267, at 118–19. 
 278. See Marchant, supra note 264, at 10650. 
 279. See Urquhart et al., supra note 17 (explaining that ―failure to test‖ as a cause of action has been 
rejected as an independent claim by more cogent case law).  
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opinion may not make it past the gatekeeper, because it could not meet the 
scientific reliability standards of expert testimony required by Daubert.280   
Moreover, patients could attempt to hold pharmaceutical companies 
responsible for failing to incorporate pharmacogenomic technology into their drug 
development process.281 There is a noted lack of legal duty to use 
pharmacogenomics to discover potential new drugs and reduce major drug adverse 
reactions—for example, idiosyncratic liver injuries that occur on a rare basis with a 
number of drugs.282 Some critics, however, assert that individuals should not be 
able to sue a drug manufacturer for failure to use pharmacogenomics to develop a 
drug that will reveal an individual‘s predisposition to deleterious side effects, 
because ―[p]rematurely imposing an actual or de facto duty on drug makers to use 
these technologies will discourage the cooperative atmosphere needed to overcome 
the current limitations of pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics.‖283   
3.  Shifts in the Standard of Care 
Pharmacogenomics may shift physicians‘ expected standard of care, although 
it is unclear at what point and to what extent the standard will change to require 
physicians to conduct genetic tests and prescribe drugs accordingly.284 Critics have 
expressed concerns about imposing liability for adverse outcomes resulting from 
the use of pharmacogenomics in diagnosis and treatment decisions.285 In the future, 
healthcare providers can expect to bear a larger share of the costs when treatment 
options fail for lack of individualized treatment.286   
At the industry level, imposing legal liability may obstruct research by 
deterring pharmaceutical companies from engaging in pharmacogenomic 
development for fear of being sued. Greater precision may shift the standard of care 
such that companies could increasingly be held responsible for ineffective 
treatment or ADRs. As pharmacogenomics develops, treatment effectiveness and 
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 285. Id. 
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side effects will become increasingly within drug manufacturers‘ control.287  One 
company, Novartis, has ―offered customers a money-back guarantee on two of its 
antihypertensive drugs,‖ demonstrating behavior more like that of other industries 
than the drug industry.288 However, mandating such action ―would be an extreme 
approach to the desired incentive structure . . . rife with ethical, social, industry and 
community concerns, even if science were fully ready to support it.‖289 Thus, the 
FDA has explored a ―safe harbor‖ from liability provision in any federal 
regulations involving pharmacogenomics in order to facilitate experimentation.290   
The anticipated changes to the standard of care for physicians and drug 
manufacturers may be, in part, a reaction to lawsuits that have been filed around the 
country.291 One such example are the personal liability suits in which, after taking 
the vaccine LYMErix, individuals claimed severe health problems akin to those 
associated with Lyme disease.292 The product was heavily advertised directly to 
consumers, and physicians expressed the common worry associated with direct-to-
consumer genetic testing—that patients would demand prescriptions even when it 
was medically inadvisable.293 Additionally, ―[o]thers feared vaccinated people 
would gain a false sense of security and let their guard down against ticks.‖294  
In 1999, a number of affected individuals brought a class action case against 
the manufacturer of LYMErix, SmithKline Beecham, alleging that it had failed to 
warn doctors and the public that nearly a third of the general population (those with 
the HLA-DR4+ allele) is susceptible to developing autoimmune arthritis if they are 
exposed to the protein that makes the vaccine work.295 In 2000, many of those who 
participated in the class action suit also filed individually against the manufacturer, 
asking that it expand its vaccine labeling.296 The plaintiffs‘ allegations included a 
failure by the drug company to warn consumers of the potential adverse effects of 
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the vaccine.297 In 2002, the drug was removed from the market due to a reduction 
in sales, likely resulting from the negative publicity surrounding the lawsuits.298 
The class action case is particularly interesting because, first, rather than seeking 
compensation for past injuries, as tort law usually mandates, the plaintiffs sought 
―protection against the risks of future injury.‖299 Second, the case is significant 
because, for maybe the first time, the class was explicitly defined by genotype.300   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Pharmacogenomics will have far-reaching and diverse effects on drug 
research and development. It promises to reduce adverse drug reactions and allow 
physicians to make more accurate diagnoses and prescription and dosage 
decisions.301 We as a society—individually and collectively—must choose the most 
appropriate regulatory and legal pathways in the effort to establish an adequate and 
protective system, both for individuals seeking new and effective drugs and society 
at large. The field of pharmacogenomics and associated genetic discoveries shape, 
and are shaped by, the current regulatory regime under the guidance of the FDA.302 
Legal and policy decision-makers, as well as insurance companies and the 
pharmaceutical industry, are entrusted with the responsibility of making proper 
resource allocation decisions. By properly distributing resources through, for 
example, the Orphan Drug Act, we can ensure that certain historically underserved 
groups are given access to therapeutic advancements.303 
Each of the various players could positively or adversely affect the role that 
pharmacogenomics can and will play in providing therapeutic innovations to the 
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public.304 The pharmaceutical industry must choose whether to pursue 
pharmacogenomic research and development, depending on financial and other 
incentives. Congress and the regulatory agencies must choose whether, and how, to 
encourage pharmacogenomic innovations while providing equal and fair access to 
targeted therapies and drugs.305 Policy-makers must also determine, through the 
patent system, how to balance the promotion of downstream pharmacogenomic 
research while protecting the rights of innovators.306 Likewise, they must consider 
the appropriate liability regime for industry, which must avoid discouraging the 
pharmaceutical industry from pursuing valuable therapeutic advancements.307 
Liability laws must also continue to allow physician independence while still 
protecting the interests of the patient, striking a balance between the conflicting 
standards of paternalism and patient autonomy.308 In light of these diverse 
decisions, education regarding the promises and consequences of 
pharmacogenomics is a basic, but significant, necessity.309 Targeted education is 
fundamental to different aspects of society, including the public at large, the 
regulatory bodies that make policy choices, and physicians and health care 
providers.   
The implications that the current legal regime has for pharmacogenomics, and 
vice versa, have only begun to be explored. However, it is imperative to proactively 
anticipate the potential dilemmas and issues associated with scientific advancement 
in order to keep legal and ethical considerations current with technological 
innovations. Only in this way can we hope to effectively advance, rather than 
hinder, appropriate technological progress while protecting the rights of individuals 
and ensuring that they receive the best medical treatment available.   
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